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INTRODUCTION
In many areas of the law, scholars have applied the methods and
insights of economic analysis to evaluate the rationales for and the ef-
fects of legal rules.' The theme running throughout the law and eco-
nomics approach is that the law does not so much repeal market forces
as restrict the channels through which those forces work. In common
law areas such as contracts and torts, and in public law areas such as
antitrust and securities regulation, law and economics scholars have
shown that many legal rules, whether through explicit intent or not,
have a tendency to foster efficient markets.2 In areas of statutory law,
however, many of these scholars have argued that legal rules often do
not promote efficiency, but that economic analysis is nevertheless useful
to analyze the manner in which profit-maximizing parties respond to
the incentives created by the rules.3
To date, few scholars have argued that American labor law is in
any way attentive to or consistent with the goal of efficiency.4 In fact,
I See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUcTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983);
R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). The current law and eco-
nomics tradition dates back to Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
1 See generally R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 20-23 (distinguishing between posi-
tive economic analysis, "which explains legal rules and outcomes as they are rather
than changing them to make them better," and normative analysis, the purpose of
which is to "clarify value conflicts and to point the way toward reaching social ends by
the most efficient path").
' See generally id. at 312 (arguing that statutory law is frequently a response to
the demand for regulation by the parties who will benefit from it).
" A notable exception is Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353
(1984). A number of other recent articles have used economic analysis to examine labor
law. See Alchian, Decision Sharing and Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory
of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 235
(1982); Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991 (1986); Fischel,
Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984); Hall, Judicial Deference to Collectively Bargained
Pension Agreements: The Implicit Economics of a Legal Standard, 4 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 111 (1986); Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988
(1984); Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
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recent works by law and economics scholars conclude that the primary
purpose of labor law is to cartelize the labor market in order to enable
workers to achieve higher wages than those that would be obtainable in
an unregulated labor market.5 According to this view, labor law exem-
plifies the "capture theory" of regulation, which postulates that the
government supplies regulation in response to the demands of interest
groups seeking limits to competition and associated noncompetitive
profits, wages, or returns to capital.' Traditional labor law scholars
share the view of these law and economics scholars that efficiency plays
little part in labor law.7 But they treat economic analysis as essentially
irrelevant, both to the labor market problem of unequal bargaining
power that they envision and to the goals of industrial democracy and
industrial peace that they espouse.
To the extent that these literatures contend or imply that efficiency
is unimportant in interpreting labor law doctrine, this Article dis-
agrees.8 This Article argues that significant elements of labor law can
245 (1987); Note, An Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining over Partial Termi-
nation and Plant Relocation Decisions, 95 YALE L.J. 949 (1986).
' See Campbell, supra note 4, at 1004-10; Posner, supra note 4. Judge Posner
argues that
labor law is ... founded on a policy that is the opposite of the policies of
competition and economic efficiency that most economists support ....
. . . My basic thesis will be that American labor law is best under-
stood as a device for facilitating, though not to the maximum possible ex-
tent, the cartelization of the labor supply by unions.
Id. at 990. Posner does not attempt to rely on the explicit language of the labor statutes
or the language of the cases to support the cartel theory. Although this Article does not
object to the examination of implicit goals rather than explicit goals (the same tech-
nique is adopted below), it should be noted that the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") describes as one of its goals the "stabilization of competitive wage rates."
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). This language suggests an appreciation of the
goal of economic efficiency.
6 See Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211, 212 (1976); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 335, 341-43 (1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 3-4 (1971).
7 Most leading casebooks contain no discussion of the economic analysis of unions
or of the labor market generally. See, e.g., A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (9th ed. 1981); C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON &
A. HYDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (2d ed. 1982). But see D. LESLIE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 44-79 (2d ed. 1985).
a Certainly, one result of union behavior has been to raise wages above competi-
tive levels. This point, which is central to the cartelization argument, see supra note 5
and accompanying text, is clearly supported by the empirical economic evidence. See
Linneman & Wachter, Rising Union Premiums and the Declining Boundaries Among
Noncompeting Groups, 76 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 103, 103 (1986). But see
R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 162-81 (1984) (arguing that
labor union premiums reflect productivity gains due to union presence). For a general
critique of the effect of unions on relative wages, see B. HIRSCH & J. ADDISON, THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS: NEW APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE 116-54 (1986).
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be viewed as attempting to remedy market failures in internal labor
markets.
One reason that labor law scholars have paid little attention to
economic efficiency may be that they focus on the economic model of
external labor markets.9 External labor markets-the markets for new
employees-closely resemble the textbook economic model in which the
supply of and demand for labor determine the wage."° These markets
approach allocative efficiency because of the mobility of workers and
competition among firms for these workers. Under such circumstances,
the law cannot enhance the efficiency of the economic result. Hence, if
labor law is concerned with the external labor market, its focus must be
on distributive or other noneconomic goals rather than allocative
efficiency.
The internal labor market, on the other hand, is the market within
a firm.11 In this market, workers seek career jobs, and the technology of
firms makes it profitable for firms to supply such jobs. Because firms
and workers invest in job-specific training12 and wage payment profiles
conducive to low monitoring costs, both groups have a stake in main-
In addition, labor law rights, including the right to strike, in many respects involve
political rather than economic issues. But these points should not obscure the argument
that court interpretations of the NLRA are in many cases compatible with efficient
contracting rules of labor economics.
' Posner and Campbell cite other reasons why economic analyses of labor law
have not been undertaken. Posner argues that economists have avoided labor law be-
cause of its doctrinal complexity and that law and economics scholars are repelled by
labor law's antiefficiency foundations. See Posner, supra note 4, at 989-90. This Article
disagrees with the latter premise.
Campbell notes that some scholars object to analyzing labor like any other com-
modity, but responds that economics can be a useful guide to interpreting an unclear
statute in a consistent way. In addition, Campbell states that some see economics as
irrelevant to labor law because the NLRA's goals are largely redistributive rather than
efficiency-related. To this objection, Campbell responds that even if redistributive goals
are paramount, economics is useful for resolving ambiguous or unanticipated cases. See
Campbell, supra note 4, at 992-94.
"0 Current views on the workings of the external labor market are explained in R.
EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 167-392 (3d ed. 1988).
" The treatment of the internal labor market in this Article follows that found in
Williamson, Wachter & Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analy-
sis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 250 (1975). For a
general and institutional treatment of internal labor markets, see P. DOERINGER & M.
PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 13-63 (1971). Cur-
rent work on internal labor markets builds upon such earlier research as that found in
Dunlop, The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory, in NEW CONCEPTS IN WAGE DE-
TERMINATION 117 (G. Taylor & F. Pierson eds. 1957); Kerr, The Balkanization of
Labor Markets, in LABOR MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 92 (E. Bakke
ed. 1954); and Ross, Do We Have a New Industrial Feudalism?, 48 AM. ECON. REV.
903 (1958).
12 The seminal work on specific training in internal labor markets is G. BECKER,
HUMAN CAPITAL 26-37 (2d ed. 1975).
1988]
1354 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
taining a strong ongoing relationship. But because the resulting im-
plicit, 3 long-term contracting makes it costly for firms to replace work-
ers and for workers to change jobs, a bilateral monopoly replaces the
textbook model of competitive supply and demand. In this environment,
asymmetric information and strategic behavior allow for inefficient out-
comes. Section IA develops this internal labor market model in more
detail.
In analyzing the internal labor market, this Article takes a Coa-
sian perspective:14 the economic challenge for internal labor markets is
to create "efficient labor contracts," which provide incentives for the
parties to engage in joint profit maximization instead of acting strategi-
cally. Although the labor law literature and this Article focus on the
statutes regulating unions and collective bargaining,15 the same Coasian
analysis can be applied to nonunion internal labor markets as well. In
this broader framework, collective bargaining and labor law rules re-
present one potential means of fostering efficient labor market
contracting.
Section IB combines the internal labor market perspective with the
Calabresi and Melamed framework,"6 which views the law as assigning
entitlements and protecting these entitlements with property, liability,
and inalienability rules. In the context of labor law, another type of
entitlement protection must be added. This rule is a "bargaining rule,"
or mandatory subject of bargaining, and is a basic method of protecting
entitlements in labor law.
The Article then turns, in Part II, to the problem of how the labor
law rules regulate a firm's adaptation to an unforeseen decline in its
product market. The Article argues that the labor law rules applicable
to subcontracting, partial closures, and relocation are consistent with
efficient contracting in the internal labor market.17 This argument in-
"s Implicit contracting is discussed in R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note
10, at 406, and described as "a set of shared, formal understandings about how firms
and workers will respond to contingencies." Id.
14 See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 7, 19-20, 42-48; Coase, supra note 1, at 2-8.
For a discussion of the Coase Theorem, see infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
'5 The main statutes are the National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198,
49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)) and the
Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)).
16 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
1" There is an extensive economic literature on implicit labor market contracting.
Recent surveys of that literature are in Parsons, The Employment Relationship: Job
Attachment, Work Effort, and the Nature of Contracts, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 789 (0. Ashenfelter & R. Layard eds. 1986); and Rosen, Implicit Con-
tracts: A Survey, 23 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1144 (1985).
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volves an efficient contracting rule, the "sunk-cost-loss rule," under
which firms may act unilaterally in response to economic downturns as
long as they incur a sunk cost loss. The most important component of
the sunk-cost-loss rule is the W * H test, which allows a firm to cut its
wage bill only by reducing hours of employment and not by reducing
the wage rate."'
The Article in Part III then applies the sunk-cost-loss rule to the
leading cases in the areas of subcontracting, partial closure, and work
relocation. Part III begins with an economic rationale of the framework
set forth by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB19 and First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.20 A num-
ber of more recent National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"Board") cases dealing with subcontracting are then considered. Part
III concludes by addressing the more complex problem of work reloca-
tion using two recent and influential NLRB cases, Milwaukee Spring
I 2 and Otis Elevator Co. H1.22 The sunk-cost-loss rule makes explicit
the economic intuitions underlying these opinions and demonstrates a
consistency across the cases that is not otherwise obvious.
I. THE INTERNAL LABOR MARKET MODEL
Because the internal labor market model has not been analyzed
using the law and economics methodology, the following discussion
briefly reviews the essential tenets of this methodology before examin-
ing the specifics of the model. In this framework, economic analysis
evaluates the efficiency of alternative labor law rules.23 In the internal
labor market, efficient legal rules are those that jointly maximize the
firm's profits and the workers' net compensation.
Economic analysis starts with a "polar case," that is, a hypotheti-
cal situation under which efficiency is achieved. The goal of the analy-
1s The theoretical framework of the W * H test is discussed in Riordan &
Wachter, What Do Implicit Contracts Do?, 35 INDUS. REL. REs. A. PROC. 291, 294-
298 (1982); Grossman & Hart, Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemploy-
ment, 71 AM. EcoN. REV. 301, 302, 306 (1981); Hall & Lilien, Efficient Wage Bar-
gains Under Uncertain Supply and Demand, 69 AM. EcoN. REV. 868, 870-75 (1979);
and Holmstrom, Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts, 98 Q.J. EcON. 23, 23-26
(1983).
19 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
20 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
21 Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), affd
sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
22 Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
23 Although there are other values that the law explicitly pursues, these values are
often consistent with efficiency. Even when they are not, efficiency may offer meaning-
ful guidance when other values provide little.
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sis is to determine how existing institutions deviate from the polar case
and to explore how policy may correct these deviations from efficiency.
The polar case most often used in law and economics scholarship is
Coasian bargaining, or zero transaction costs. In this polar case, the
Coase theorem holds that the legal default setting does not affect the
allocative outcome between two parties. Instead, the parties continually
maintain allocative efficiency by engaging in every possible mutually
beneficial transaction. 4
Deviations from this polar case result from transaction costs. 5 If
transaction costs exist, inefficient outcomes may result. The existence of
transaction costs in the internal labor market, however, does not alone
provide a justification for government intervention. This is because pri-
vate parties themselves have incentives to correct identifiable market
failure and minimize transaction costs. Depending on the information
available to government regulators, a public policy response to market
failure may be more or less efficient than the private market response.2"
The internal labor market model identifies the high transaction
costs present in much labor bargaining and explores the institutions
created by private parties and the government to reduce these costs.
The following subsections introduce the internal labor market model
and apply it to collective bargaining under the labor laws. Subsection A
develops the rationale for and the components of the internal labor
market. Subsection B uses the economic approach to entitlement setting
to explore collective bargaining within the internal labor market.
A. The Need for an Internal Labor Market: Job-Specific Training,
Monitoring Costs, and Strategic Behavior
To understand labor market failure, one must differentiate be-
tween two distinct markets in which firms and workers bargain: exter-
nal and internal labor markets.27 In the external labor market, workers
seek new job opportunities across firms.2" Similarly, firms seek new
24 See Schwab, supra note 4, at 256-61. Schwab discusses extensively the implica-
tions of the Coase Theorem for collective bargaining. The extent to which entitlements
are in fact traded in the collective bargaining context is discussed infra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text.
25 For example, transaction costs of bargaining include the costs of negotiating,
drafting, and enforcing agreements.
28 See Coase, supra note 1, at 17-18.
27 See P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, supra note 11, at 2 ("The internal labor
market, governed by administrative rules, is to be distinguished from the external labor
market of conventional economic theory where pricing, allocating, and training deci-
sions are controlled directly by economic variables.").
28 See R. EHRENBERG & R. SmiTH, supra note 10, at 14-15. Ehrenberg and
Smith do not specifically define the external labor market. The "external labor market"
[Vol. 136:1349
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employees to expand production or replace lost workers. Most firms
and workers, however, deal with each other in a labor market that ex-
ists within the firm, a market comprised of long-term career workers
and the firm that hired them. This market is termed the "internal labor
market."29
The external labor market, on which economics textbooks concen-
trate,30 matches the supply of workers with general skills to the de-
mand of firms in need of such skills. The external labor market is both
diverse and geographically large, since any given set of high school
graduates may become semiskilled workers in firms as different as
American Home Products, Citicorp, General Electric, Hospital Corpo-
ration of America, Safeway, or USX. The overwhelming evidence sug-
gests that external labor markets are competitive, even more competitive
than product markets. 1 Hence, the textbook model of labor supply and
demand reasonably describes the external labor market.
Internal labor markets develop as workers and firms establish
ongoing contractual relationships 2 and look less to the external market
to sell and buy labor services. Because internal labor markets have rela-
tively few participants, and all of them have limited mobility, the bar-
gaining process poses problems of market failure and high transaction
costs.33 The parties attempt to minimize these transaction costs by writ-
ing efficient contracts, while government decisionmakers address the
to which this Article refers is analogous to what they describe as a "national labor
market" or "local labor market," depending on its scope. See id. at 14.
29 See id. ("When a formal set of rules and procedures guides and constrains the
employment relationship within a firm, an internal labor market is said to exist."); id.
at 159-60 (discussing how hiring from within creates an internal labor market); see
also P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, supra note 11, at 13-90 (developing the theoretical
concept of the internal labor market).
SO See, e.g., R. DORNBUSCH & S. FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 377 (3d ed. 1984)
("The relationship among wages, prices, and employment and between employment
and output will now be studied in an idealized frictionless case."); S. MAISEL,
MACROECONOMIcS 413 (1982) ("These assumptions include a market [in which
p]rices are determined by perfect competition among firms and workers . . ").
" For example, Ehrenberg and Smith discuss labor market monopsony on only
seven pages of their text. See R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 10, at 70-73,
84-86. Their discussion indicates that monopsonistic labor markets are uncommon. See
id. at 71-73; see also Fischel, supra note 4, at 1067 ("[A] substantial body of evidence
suggests that labor markets are surprisingly competitive even in situations where intui-
tion might suggest otherwise." (citing R. HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION:
BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1865-1914 (1977); Roback, Southern Labor
Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161
(1984)).
11 These contractual relationships can be either explicit, written contracts, or im-
plicit, unwritten agreements. See R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 10, at 406-
08. Implicit contracts are based on the mutual expectations of employers and employ-
ees. See id. at 160, 406.
11 See Williamson, Wachter & Harris, supra note 11, at 254.
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problem by setting default entitlements and enforcing explicit and im-
plicit contractual provisions.
Labor law can be viewed, in part, as an attempt to lower the high
transaction costs of internal labor markets while capturing the effi-
ciency gains that such markets promise.34 This theory does not imply
that policymakers are consciously motivated by economic efficiency;
rather, this theory looks to the effects of policies that attempt to balance
the interests of parties involved in economic disputes. The effects of
labor law are in many cases, but not always, compatible with
efficiency.
1. Transaction Costs in the Internal Labor Market
Internal labor markets emerge as an institutional response to the
interest of workers in career jobs and the technological and cost effi-
ciencies of using such workers. Thus, internal labor markets reduce
some of the costs associated with exclusive use of external labor mar-
kets. But internal labor markets also exhibit high transaction costs, as-
sociated with job-specific training and monitoring, that give rise to
asymmetric information and strategic behavior.
Job-specific training refers to training that has value primarily in
a particular firm and is not transferable to alternative firms. 5 Job-
specific training prepares workers for the special requirements of a
given job, but consequently limits their ability to change jobs at low
cost. On the other hand, job-specific training gives incumbent workers a
productivity advantage over new workers. This productivity gap be-
tween incumbent and new workers shrinks the labor supply pool,
which in turn violates one of the necessary conditions for competitive
markets.
Monitoring refers to the fact that work effort can vary over a large
range and that it is costly for firms to control work effort. Because of
monitoring costs, firms cannot quickly and easily distinguish workers
who perform up to standard from workers who shirk on the job.
"' Fischel has identified several broad categories of transaction costs that differen-
tiate labor markets from capital markets. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 1065-68. Ac-
cording to Fischel, "[tihe three most important differences are that capital markets are
closer to the ideal of perfect competition than labor markets; that possibilities of firm-
specific investments exist in labor markets that do not exist in capital markets; and that
participants in labor markets have less ability to diversify risk." Id. at 1065. The dif-
ference between the view expressed in this Article and Fischel's is that this Article finds
these distinctions to be decisive rationales for different legal treatment of labor markets,
while Fischel is more skeptical that the distinctions mandate different treatment. See id.
at 1065-68.
" See Williamson, Wachter & Harris, supra note 11, at 256-58, 260-61.
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Job-specific training and monitoring are associated with the more
general problem of asymmetric information. 6 Asymmetric information
describes the fact that workers and firms have comparative advantages
in gathering different types of valuable information. Incumbent work-
ers have a comparative advantage in knowing their performance level
and their opportunity wage ("OW"). These informational advantages
allow incumbents to increase a firm's costs of monitoring work effort.
The firm, on the other hand, has its own informational compara-
tive advantages. The firm is better able to determine the workers' mar-
ginal product ("MP"): the value of the workers to the firm based on
product market conditions, net of monitoring costs.3" The firm's man-
agers acquire inside information regarding the demand for the firm's
product and hence the firm's derived demand for labor. 8 The firm also
has informational advantages concerning its technological opportunities,
such as its ability to substitute capital for labor. 9 These informational
advantages make it costly for workers to monitor the firm's claims con-
cerning product market conditions.
One possible solution to the problems created by asymmetric infor-
mation is to delegate information gathering and reporting tasks to the
lower cost party.40 Assigning this responsibility to the lower cost party,
however, poses a dilemma. The party that collects the information can
use it strategically.4 ' Strategic behavior is the use of private information
to realize individual profits at the expense of jointly maximized
profits. 2
38 Asymmetric information is a well-known cause of market failure in economics.
See, e.g., Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488, 490-92 (1970).
" More precisely, the marginal product of a factor of production such as labor is
the addition to the firm's output resulting from the last added unit of the factor. The
marginal value product is the marginal product multiplied by the unit price of the
output. See R. HELFGOTT, LABOR ECONOMICS 299 (2d ed. 1980).
8 The term "derived demand" refers to a demand for a commodity, such as labor,
that depends upon the demand for the goods and services the commodity helps produce.
See id. at 275.
38 More generally, the firm knows the marginal rates of substitution across all
factors of production. The marginal rate of substitution of one factor of production for
another is simply the ratio of the marginal products of the two factors. See E. MANS-
FIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 136 (1970).
40 See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-73 (1970) (dis-
cussing an analogous scheme in which accident costs are allocated to the party that
could avoid them more cheaply).
41 See Riordan & Wachter, supra note 18, at 293.
42 The term "strategic behavior" is often used more broadly in economics to de-
note a bargaining strategy under which the bargainer withholds or misrepresents pri-
vate information. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, supra note 1, at 18; Schwab, supra note 4, at
268-72. Strategic behavior in this broad sense may or may not lead to inefficient bar-
gaining outcomes. Strategic behavior as used in this Article, however, is a subset of all
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Strategic behavior is made possible by "sunk investments"4 made
by workers and firms in the internal labor market. When the parties
make sunk investments, they expect to earn a future return, or quasi-
rent," on these investments. But whether one party to an internal labor
market contract receives its full expected quasi-rents after making an
investment may depend on the actions of the other party. Specifically,
one party can opportunistically expropriate the other party's return on
investments, in which case the investing party suffers a "sunk cost
loss."' "5 This potential for expropriating the investing party's quasi-
rents, thus imposing a sunk cost loss, represents the bargaining power
of the other party.
For example, workers make sunk investments in their jobs by
agreeing to long-term implicit contracts that provide for "deferred com-
pensation," that is, below-market wages at early stages of employment
and above-market wages at later stages.4 There are two explanations
strategic behavior and is perhaps best defined as the inefficient breach of an implicit
contract. A term for this type of behavior is "opportunism." See, e.g., Alchian, supra
note 4, at 238; Williamson, Wachter & Harris, supra note 11, at 258-59. But see
Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1101 (1981)
(using the terms "opportunistic" and "strategic" behavior interchangeably).
' Sunk investments are investments that have already occurred and cannot be
recalled. Cf J. QUIRK, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 172 (3d ed. 1987) (stating
that sunk costs, "represent water over the dam," because "no decision now is going to
alter the firm's obligation [based on a previous contract] to pay them.").
"" Quasi-rents are net returns over maintenance costs that accrue to sunk invest-
ments. Quasi-rents are distinguished from pure economic rents. While economic rents
"refer to any earnings beyond what is required to bring forth the services of the factor
of production," quasi-rents are "the short-run earnings of any reproducible factor of
production." Id. at 251. "More precisely, quasi-rent is any return to a resource above
that necessary for its temporary existence." Alchian, supra note 4, at 238-39. Quasi-
rents are described graphically in E. MANSFIELD, supra note 39, at 352-53.
15 The term "sunk cost loss" has not been used before. It is more descriptive and
less intimidating, however, than the more cumbersome term, "expropriated quasi-
rents," and therefore it is used almost exclusively in this Article. The term "sunk cost
loss" is not restricted to the loss of quasi-rents that have been expropriated by manage-
ment or the union. It also encompasses the loss of any expected profit by any means,
including product market adjustments, mismanagement, or any other decline in the
firm's profitability.
48 In this discussion, the term "deferred compensation" does not refer only to pen-
sion plans, under which workers defer compensation until they retire. Rather, the term
is used more broadly to encompass wages above opportunity wages in the latter part of
an employee's worklife. Deferred compensation in this form can represent either re-
turns to an investment in specific training or repayment of a bond posted by workers
early in their careers as a means of monitoring their work effort. These types of de-
ferred compensation schemes are commonly referred to as "backloading" of wages. See
R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 10, at 421-26.
In addition, the presence of transaction costs associated with worker mobility
across firms generates a wedge between workers' wages and their opportunity wages.
This wedge is also "deferred compensation," since we use this term to refer to any
difference between wages and opportunity wages.
[Vol. 136:1349
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
for these sunk investments. First, workers invest in job-specific training,
and deferred compensation represents the quasi-rents earned on this
training. Second, workers invest in monitoring in the form of deferred
compensation. In this case, the deferred compensation acts as a bond,
and represents the potential penalty for shirking on the job.4 Once
workers make a sunk investment in monitoring or job-specific training,
the firm acquires bargaining power over them because it can strategi-
cally force the workers to suffer a sunk cost loss by misrepresenting
product market conditions, thereby expropriating the workers' expected
return.
Similarly, firms make sunk investments in workers by paying
wages above marginal product at the beginning and end of a worker's
career. The firm expects to earn a return on this investment during the
middle years of the worker's career. Workers can deprive the firm of its
expected return by misrepresenting their work effort. Reduced work
effort forces the firm to increase its monitoring of workers, which low-
ers the workers' marginal products and with them the firm's profits.
The solution to the inherent dilemma posed by asymmetric infor-
mation and strategic behavior is an efficient internal labor market con-
tract. An efficient contract minimizes transaction costs by providing in-
centives for both parties to reveal their private information through
their actions rather than to strategically misrepresent or conceal it.
Since information disclosure is itself costly and can be used strategically
by the other party, efficient contracts will not usually require actual
disclosure. Rather, they create incentives under which the lower cost
party automatically loses profits whenever it acts strategically,48 so that
the contract is at least partially "self-enforcing." 4
"' The monitoring argument was developed first by Lazear, Agency, Earnings
Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 606 (1981), and
Medoff & Abraham, Are Those Paid More Really More Productive?: The Case of
Experience, 26 J. HuM. RESOURCES 186 (1981). Differentiation between the specific
training and monitoring explanations of deferred compensation is discussed by Hutch-
ens, A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts, 4 J. LAB. ECON. S153
(1987).
The monitoring argument also arises in the law and economics literature on law
enforcement. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, supra note 1, at 73-84 (arguing that deterrence
can often be maintained for risk-neutral people by increasing penalties while decreasing
monitoring costs).
48 Another example of a self-enforcing legal rule is the rule of expectation dam-
ages for breach of contract. Expectation damages force the breaching party to compen-
sate for the entire loss caused to the other party. Thus, if the breaching party still finds
it profitable to breach the agreement, breach will be the efficient, profit-maximizing
result. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 1, at 27-28.
"' For a recent economic discussion of self-enforcing contracts, see Azariadis,
Human Capital and Self-Enforcing Contracts, 90 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. (1988)
(forthcoming).
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2. Graphical Analysis of the Internal Labor Market
The problem posed by strategic behavior can be demonstrated by a
graphical analysis. Figure 1 plots three different relationships between
representative workers' ages and the compensation they receive in the
internal labor market. The workers enter the internal labor market at
age a and retire at age f
Figure 1
Market Wages, Marginal
Dollars
OW
W
MP
Productivity, and Opportunity Wages over
the Life Cycle
W
MP
OW
a
Key:
W•
MP.
OW-
b c d e f
wage paid by the firm to its workers
productivity of the workers in their current jobs
wage and productivity of the workers in the external labor
market
The OW curve represents the workers' opportunity wage, which is
the best alternative wage the workers could earn in the external labor
market. Because the external labor market is competitive,5" workers re-
maining in that market throughout their worklife will always be paid
0 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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their marginal product; thus, the OW curve represents workers' life-
time marginal productivity in the external market as well as their life-
time opportunity wage. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that
OW is constant over much of the worklife,51 and that it declines near
the end of the worklife due to poor health and skill obsolescence.
The MP curve shows the workers' marginal productivity in their
career jobs.5 2 Early in their careers, the untrained workers' MP is
lower than their OW. This low productivity results from time spent in
training activities and the relatively high cost of monitoring new work-
ers.53 MP then increases due to the effects of job-specific training and
reduced monitoring costs, and beyond age c," MP surpasses OW.5  As
the workers get older, MP and OW decline for the same reasons: aging
and obsolescence.
The W curve represents the career wage profile paid by the firm
to its workers. Both the firm and the workers know the location of W.
In an internal labor market job, workers' wages increase throughout
their working careers. This age earnings profile reflecting deferred
compensation is a key feature of an efficient labor market contract.56
The workers' investment pattern is shown by comparing W with
OW. When W is below OW, that is until age d, workers invest in
monitoring and job-specific training by taking a lower wage than they
can get elsewhere. They are willing to make this investment because
after age d, W exceeds OW. This return to the workers' own invest-
ment becomes their quasi-rent after they reach age d. The net return to
the workers, discounted to present value, must be sufficient to en-
courage them to take a job that requires monitoring and job-specific
training. Thus, it must at least equal the present value of lifetime OW.
The firm's investment pattern can be seen by comparing W and
MP. When W exceeds MP, the firm is investing, and when MP ex-
ceeds W, the firm is recouping. In Figure 1, the firm makes net invest-
ments until age b and again after age e; between these two points, the
51 That is, it is assumed that workers gain specific skills helpful to their career
job, but not general skills that would raise their marginal productivity in any job and
thereby raise their opportunity wage. But see G. BECKER, supra note 12, at 26 (noting
that much job training is partially specific and partially general).
52 Their marginal productivity in other jobs, which are in the external labor mar-
ket, is represented by OW. See supra text accompanying note 50.
" Time spent by a supervisor or other employee on training a new hire is also a
cost imposed on the new hire's MP. "
The precise ordering of points b, c, d, and e is not determined by the theory.
5 In the internal market, the sum of all MP points over the workers' lifetime
equals the sum of all OW points over their lifetime, discounted to present value, so that
their averages are also equal. In the external market, where there is no long-term rela-
tionship between a firm and its workers, MP is equal to OW at all points.
56 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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firm recoups its investment. The firm's net return, discounted to pre-
sent value, must be sufficient to induce the firm to invest in monitoring
And job-specific training.
The firm's primary mechanism for behaving strategically is to cut
its wage rate (that is, to lower the W curve in Figure 1). The firm may
be able to do this by convincing the workers that product market condi-
tions have worsened (that the MP curve has shifted downward). The
workers are vulnerable to false or exaggerated claims of product market
decline because it is too costly for them to verify these claims or to take
a different job. Workers are most vulnerable during the ef stage. In that
stage, workers are recouping their investments while the firm has al-
ready fully recouped its investment and is again a net investor. More-
over, at this stage, the difference between W and OW is greatest. Thus,
the workers in this stage of the worklife cycle have the most to lose
from a strategic cut in W.
The workers' primary mechanism for behaving strategically is to
impose monitoring costs on the firm by misrepresenting their perform-
ance level. Shirking lowers the MP curve and thereby imposes losses on
the firm by reducing the amount it recoups on its investment. The firm
is most vulnerable during its recoupment stage, be. Workers can also
behave strategically by threatening to quit. However, because workers
do not fully recoup until the end of their careers, quitting is a less
viable option than shirking.
Strategic behavior occurs not only as an initiative to capture the
quasi-rents of the other party, but also as a reprisal. For example, if
the workers believe that the firm is acting strategically, they can re-
spond by imposing higher monitoring costs. The possibility of reprisals,
which can lead to a cycle of strategic behavior, is important to the issue
of efficient contract rules. An efficient contract rule that deters strategic
behavior in the first instance also deters reprisals.
Figure l's graphical analysis provides rough guidelines for mea-
suring the potential profits from strategic behavior. For example, the
steeper the age-earnings profile ("W" in Figure 1), the larger the em-
ployer's potential gains from strategic behavior, absent specific reasons
to suppose that older workers are more efficient than younger workers.
Conversely, the steeper the MP profile, the greater the workers' poten-
tial gains from strategic behavior.
B. Default Entitlement Settings in the Internal Labor Market
The preceding Section demonstrated that internal labor markets,
which consist of ongoing contractual relationships between a firm and
its workers, result from high transaction costs indigenous to labor rela-
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tions. Furthermore, efficiently operating internal labor markets mini-
mize strategic behavior and thus foster and protect the specific training
and monitoring of workers. This Section examines the role of labor law
in creating and maintaining efficient internal labor markets.
According to the economic approach to contract law, legal rules
are default settings: entitlements that apply in the absence of a contrary
agreement, or in the presence of an ambiguous agreement, between
contracting parties. Labor statutes and their interpretation by the
Board and courts represent the default settings of traditional labor law.
If these default settings are inefficient, and there are no transaction
costs, including legal impediments, the entitlements will be traded be-
tween the parties to create an efficient entitlements setting.57
Even with positive transaction costs, the parties may be able to
create efficient contracts on their own. For example, firms and workers
may split both the cost of and return from such investments in specific
training and monitoring. When both parties invest, they each have an
incentive to avoid strategic behavior in order to protect their invest-
ments."' In addition, general monitoring of management is often
achieved through grievance procedures. Such procedures are cost-effi-
cient means of reducing the potential for strategic behavior.
Private bargaining does not, however, successfully resolve all inter-
nal labor market problems. Not all transaction costs can be eliminated.
Those that remain hamper the efficient trading of entitlements.59 For
51 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
58 See G. BECKER, supra note 12, at 26-37. Becker noted that the division of the
burden "depend[s] on the relations between quit rates and wages, layoff rates and prof-
its, and on other factors . . ., such as the cost of funds, attitudes toward risk, and
desires for liquidity." Id. at 30.
" In reaching this conclusion, the line of inquiry taken by Schwab, whose "thesis
is that the Coase Theorem applies to a large and important class of labor law issues,"
Schwab, supra note 4, at 246, must be distinguished. Schwab does not go so far as to
say that initial entitlements in labor law do not matter. See id. at 265 n.77 ("Indeed,
the efficiency prediction of the Coase Theorem should . . . not be accepted as dogma,
but rather as a hypothesis capable of empirical testing."). He is, however, optimistic
that collective bargaining agreements are efficient. For example, Schwab argues that
the "asymmetrical information problem can be overstated." Id. at 280. In addition, he
suggests that the "problem of strategic lying in labor negotiations" is mitigated in part
by labor law's prohibition of such lying. Id. at 272. To the contrary, this Article main-
tains that the problems of asymmetric information and strategic behavior are at the
crux of understanding labor law rules.
Schwab does recognize that the internal labor market model may be a fruitful
alternative to his approach, but he decides to limit his inquiry to the Coasian model:
Law and economics scholars may find it implausible to apply the
Coase Theorem, with its assumption of zero transaction costs, to collective
bargaining. An alternative model of relational contracts may ultimately
prove equally useful in examining the effect of labor law on collective
bargaining . ...
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example, such trades may be the result of strategic exploitation of bar-
gaining power possessed by one of the parties. In addition, as Professor
Leslie has pointed out,60 many of the entitlements involved in labor law
may not be traded once they are set because of large wealth effects and
other problems.6" In the presence of transaction costs, the default set-
tings established by legal rules have economic consequences. In setting
default entitlements, therefore, the Board and courts often implicitly, if
not explicitly, consider the economic consequences.62
There are two traditional criteria for setting entitlements: effi-
ciency and equity. 3 The efficiency criterion, which evaluates legal
rules against a standard of joint profit maximization" and reduced po-
tential for strategic behavior, is the main focus of this Article. The eq-
uity criterion is concerned with the distribution of total profits. As
Judge Posner suggests, one of the policies of the NLRA 5 may be to
redistribute income to unionized workers from other groups. 66 Such re-
distribution may be difficult to achieve through entitlement-setting,
Rather than adopt the relational contract model, this Article applies
the costless Coase Theorem to collective bargaining. It is important to see
what insights basic Coasean analysis can shed on labor law, before investi-
gating more complex models of collective bargaining.
Id. at 248-49 n.11.
For a discussion of the costs associated with internal markets, see supra notes 35-
49 and accompanying text.
60 See D. LESLIE, supra note 7, at 369-73 (problems faced by labor negotiators
include justifying to the union members the trading away of entitlements and the reve-
lation of information on the union's true priorities that might be used strategically by
management).
6 Schwab and Leslie stake out the polar cases in the debate over the trading of
entitlements. Schwab argues that transaction costs in labor negotiations are sufficiently
low that inefficient entitlements will be traded frequently. See Schwab, supra note 4, at
267. Leslie, on the other hand, believes that transaction costs are sufficiently high that
entitlements will rarely be traded, or "waived." See D. LESLIE, supra note 7, at 372.
This Article stakes out a middle ground by arguing that the transaction costs of
strategic behavior and asymmetric information will sometimes prevent the efficient
trading of entitlements, but that the parties are often able to overcome these transaction
costs by writing efficient long-term contracts.
62 See infra notes 138-262 and accompanying text.
83 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1093-1105. Calabresi and Me-
lamed categorize the criteria as "economic efficiency, distributional preferences, and
other justice considerations." Id. at 1093. If equity is defined broadly to include all
social preferences and merit considerations, then "distributional preferences" and
"other justice considerations" become two types of equity criteria.
'"Joint profit maximization does not factor in considerations of how the maxi-
mized profits are to be distributed; that question is one of equity, not efficiency.
65 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
66 See Posner, supra note 4, at 1001-04 (describing governmental support,
through both the NLRA and enforcement decisions, of the "cartelization" of the labor
market); cf. Fischel, supra note 4, at 1076-77 (criticizing the argument that unioniza-
tion effects a favorable redistribution of wealth).
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however, because of the competitiveness of capital markets and external
labor markets, which serve as substitutes for internal labor markets.
When firms in capital markets and workers in external labor markets
can bargain toward allocative efficiency, any redistribution resulting
from inefficient entitlements in the union sector will be lost in the long
run.
1. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienable Entitlements in
Labor Law
To settle conflicts, an adjudicator-must make two determinations:
which party to entitle and how to protect that entitlement.17 Entitle-
ments can be absolute, which means that all or most uses of the re-
source are protected, or intermediate, which ultimately means that only
some uses of the resource are protected."8 Intermediate entitlements are
often more efficient than absolute entitlements.6 9
a. Inalienable Entitlements
Calabresi and Melamed, in their seminal article,70 distinguish
three means of protecting entitlements. First, an entitlement can be ina-
lienable.7' A party assigned an inalienable entitlement may not trade it
617 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1090-93.
11 Cf. W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 18
(1979) (noting that an ownership right would allow the holder most uses, but not, for
example, the right to limit the sale of property to a certain racial group, while a mere
possessory interest may only allow for more limited uses); A. POLINSKY, supra note 1,
at 18 (discussing limits on property use, such as a resident's right to be free from
factory pollution above a certain level, as intermediate entitlements).
89 The sunk-cost-loss rule, see infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text, is an
example of an intermediate entitlement. It assigns the right to act to the firm, but
restricts both the instances and the manner through which action can be taken. Like-
wise, the right to strike is an intermediate entitlement. Although employees striking
over unfair labor practices are entitled on request to reinstatement and ouster of any
replacement workers hired, employees striking over economic issues may not be able to
regain their jobs from replacement workers. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 341-43 (1976). The intermediate
nature of the workers' right to strike is paralleled by the intermediate nature of an
employer's ability to avoid strikes; even if the employer obtains a no-strike agreement
from the union, the workers are free to strike over a serious unfair labor practice. See 2
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1023-24 (C. Morris ed. 2d ed. 1983); THE DEVELOP-
ING LABOR LAW: SECOND EDITION FIRST SUPPLEMENT 1982-84, at 259 (A. Harper,
S. Logothetis & H. Datz eds. 1985). Other limitations on workers' strikes also illustrate
the intermediate nature of the entitlement. A union representing health-care workers,
for example, must provide to the health-care employer a 10-day notice of its intent to
strike. See NLRA § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1982); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra, at 1005.
70 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16.
71 See id. at 1111-15; see also Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of
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away. Policymakers use inalienable entitlements when they determine
that transaction costs are so high that efficient trades cannot be made. 2
In particular, if the potential for strategic behavior is great, it may be
undesirable to allow the entitlement to be traded because of the danger
that the trade represents strategic coercion" or a sacrifice of long-term
interests to achieve a short-term gain.7 4 Labor law makes relatively fre-
quent use of inalienable entitlements because workers in internal labor
markets are unusually susceptible to strategic behavior on the part of
the firm.75 Examples of inalienable entitlements include the right of
workers to unionize, 6 the prohibition of company unions,7 and the
rules governing union elections.7 Inalienable entitlements, however,
are less difficult to determine and analyze than those that may be
traded. Thus, this Article concentrates on alienable entitlements.
b. Liability Rules
The second way an entitlement can be protected is by a liability
rule. Under a liability rule, a party may voluntarily trade the entitle-
ment away, and another party may take the entitlement from the origi-
Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985) ("Inalienability can be defined
as any restriction on the transferability, ownership, or use of an entitlement.").
72 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1112; Rose-Ackerman, supra note
71, at 937-40. Inalienability rules may also serve distributive goals, see Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 16, at 1114-15; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 71, at 940-41, and
paternalistic goals, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1113-14.
" Cf Rose-Ackerman, supra note 71, at 940 (noting the prisoner's dilemma
problem).
"' See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1113 (labeling this type of restric-
tion "self paternalism").
" The ubiquity of inalienable entitlements in labor law contrasts with the paucity
of such entitlements in corporate law, which governs financial markets. Cf Fischel,
supra note 4, at 1062-68 (noting that corporate law operates from the assumption that
firms have incentives to maximize investors' wealth, while labor law assumes that, ab-
sent regulation, firms will operate in a manner that oppresses labor).
76 See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Although § 7 gives workers the
"right to refrain from" joining a union, it does not allow workers to give up their right
to join a union in return for, say, higher wages. Cf NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or
discourage union membership by using discriminatory terms of employment).
" See NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982) (making it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with the formation of or to contribute financially
to a labor organization).
11 See NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982). For an analysis of inalienable rights
in labor law, see generally Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the
NLRA: Part 1, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 335 (1981) (attempting to formulate a principle
limiting unions' ability to waive workers' rights); Harper, Union Waiver of Employee
Rights Under the NLRA: Part 11, A Fresh Approach to Board Deferral to Arbitra-
tion, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 680 (1981) (continuing analysis of union nonwaiver principles
in the context of the effect of arbitration).
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nal entitlement holder, provided that the entitlement is paid for at a
value assessed by a court or other adjudicatory body."
In contract law, liability rule protection is typically used in breach
of contract cases when the breach is efficient rather than strategic.8 ° In
such cases, the breached-against party is protected by receiving the
profits that would have been received had the contract been fulfilled.
Such liability rule protection is efficient when the damages of the
breached-against party are easy to measure. 8
In internal labor markets, the potential for strategic breach is
great. As a result, labor law makes relatively infrequent use of liability
rules. For example, breaches of contract involving mandatory bargain-
ing subjects are remedied by specific performance, sometimes supple-
mented with back pay, as determined by the Board, court, or arbitra-
tor.82 Liability rule protection, however, typically holds when contract
breach involves a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.
8 3
In addition, the entitlements in internal labor markets are often
idiosyncratic and hence have no readily available market substitutes
against which they can be measured." As a consequence, the parties
often do not rely on court-assessed damages85 and instead write con-
tractual provisions that specify liquidated damages in the form of sever-
ance pay, pensions, early retirement, or other monetary compensation.86
These liquidated damage clauses serve as a type of liability rule protec-
tion for laid off or discharged workers and typically are enforced by the
Board and courts.
11 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1092.
80 See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 106.
81 See A. POLINSKY, supra note 1, at 20-23.
82 Mandatory subjects of bargaining are discussed infra, notes 95-103 and accom-
panying text.
83 If the parties reach an agreement on a nonmandatory subject, then the new
entitlement is protected only by a liability rule. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of
Am., Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157,
183-88 (1971).
84 See R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 10, at 159-60 (describing the
difficulty of estimating costs and benefits within internal labor markets).
"I Conduct governed by the Act is not, however, immune from liability rules if
damages can be easily computed by the adjudicating body. See, e.g., Virginia Elec.
Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943) (requiring employer to reimburse em-
ployees for union dues paid to an employer dominated labor organization); Truck
Drivers, Local 705, 210 N.L.R.B. 210, 212 (1974) (requiring union, as a remedy for
coercive practices, to reimburse employer for initiation fees and dues that employer
paid on behalf of its employees); F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 291-94
(1950) (requiring back pay to be computed using a specific formula).
"' See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 48:1, 53:2 (1945).
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c. Property Rules
The third way way to protect an entitlement is by a property rule.
Under a property rule, parties may voluntarily trade their entitle-
ments,87 but entitlements may not otherwise be legally taken from
them.88 Some examples of property rules in labor law include cease and
desist orders, reinstatement orders, and findings of "no unfair labor
practice" based on management prerogatives. Property rules are rela-
tively efficient when lawmakers are fairly certain either which party
values the entitlement more or which party is less likely to use the
entitlement strategically.8" If the court or the Board uses property rules
to resolve labor disputes, two polar options are available: to give the
entitlement to act to the firm or give the entitlement to be free from the
action to the workers.
Assigning an entitlement to the firm and protecting it with a prop-
erty rule essentially adds a legally implied "management rights
clause" 91 to the labor contract. Under this rule, the firm could unilater-
ally decide whether to take an action not explicitly addressed by the
existing agreement. For example, in the absence of a specific prohibi-
tion in the labor contract, a court could assign to the firm the right to
close a portion of its operations and to lay off union workers in re-
sponse to changing market conditions. The workers would then attempt
to bargain with the firm to preserve the status quo, possibly offering
concessions in return for assurances that the firm would not take a par-
ticular action. However, if the firm's entitlement to take a particular
action is protected by a property rule, it would be under no obligation
either to bargain or to agree. 2
The opposite polar default setting, assigning the entitlement to the
workers and protecting it with a property rule, would imply a complete
87 A more traditional legal expression for the trading of entitlements is "waiver of
rights."
88 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1092 (defining a property rule
entitlement as something that may be taken only through purchase in a voluntary
transaction).
88 See A. POLINSKY, supra note 1, at 15-24 (examining the application of the
Coase theorem to nuisance law); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1106-10 &
n.37 (defining property and liability rules).
90 Of course, other options assigning intermediate entitlements are available, but
the present discussion is limited to the options concerning absolute entitlements for
simplicity.
91 A "management rights clause," also called "management prerogatives" or
"management functions," is a contract clause that gives management the right to make
unilateral decisions on issues that are normally subject to some degree of control by the
union. See R. GORMAN, supra note 69, at 505-06.
'2 Labor law terms this situation "permissive bargaining." See id. at 523-25.
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"work preservation clause" into the labor contract.93 This rule would
preserve the jobs and working conditions of employees according to the
current practice under all circumstances. Unless the workers agreed to
bargain with the firm and then further agreed to sacrifice jobs or wages
in return for management concessions, the firm would be unable to take
any action resulting in loss of jobs or a cut in wages that was not ex-
plicitly permitted by the contract. 4
2. Bargaining Rules in Labor Law
The National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, offers a fourth type of entitlement protection unique to collective
bargaining in the unionized sector. The Board and the courts employ
this kind of default setting by declaring an entitlement to be a
"mandatory subject of bargaining."9 To be consistent with both the
legal and the economic terminology, mandatory subjects of bargaining
are referred to as "entitlements protected by bargaining rules." As dis-
cussed above, nonmandatory, or permissive, subjects are those entitle-
ments protected by property rules.96 Accordingly, bargaining rules and
property rules are mutually exclusive categories.
9' In the nonunion sector, the default setting generally assigns the entitlement to
make employment decisions to the employer and protects it with a property rule. There
has been much discussion, however, regarding the possible erosion of this doctrine,
known as employment at will. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1404, 1404-05 (1967) (advocating limitations on employment at will doctrine because
of potential employer abuses); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CH.
L. REv. 947, 952 (1984) (criticizing attacks on employment at will for ignoring nonle-
gal means of preserving long-term employment relationships and the greater imperfec-
tions of alternative rules); Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a
Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 425 (1986)
(advocating a return to common law creativity in reconciling employment at will and
doctrines that weaken it); Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract
of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Em-
ployment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082, 1104-09 (1984) (advocating increased
protection of individual contracts by protecting individuals against unjust dismissal and
by limiting the common law employment at will doctrine). The change in the doctrine
of at-will employment represents the limitations of and shifts in the legal default
settings.
"' Property rule protection for workers may be appropriate if firms have made
few sunk investments, and are therefore highly mobile, and workers have made great
sunk investments, and are therefore highly immobile.
11 The term "mandatory subject of bargaining" describes those subjects included
in "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" over which NLRA
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), requires bargaining. The Supreme Court adopted
this terminology in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-
49 (1958). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 69, at 498-509 (discussing the mandatory
subjects of bargaining).
98 Note, however, that if these entitlements are contained in an existing collective
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a. Description of Bargaining Rules
Under the bargaining rule, a party seeking either to assert a new
entitlement or to change an existing entitlement concerning " 'wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' " commits an
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain in good faith to impasse
when the other party desires to bargain. 97 Thus, if a proposed term in
a collective bargaining agreement involves an entitlement protected by a
bargaining rule, the firm may not unilaterally implement the proposal
without first bargaining to impasse. Moreover, each party is allowed to
inflict certain costs (using "economic weapons") on the other party in
support of its bargaining position. The union may strike, and the firm
may lock out and replace the workers. 8
Lastly, the parties themselves must resolve disputes over entitle-
ments protected by a bargaining rule. The Board and the courts will
not determine entitlements protected by a bargaining rule as they will
other entitlements. 9 Once the parties set the entitlement in their collec-
tive agreement, however, the Board and the courts will protect that en-
titlement, usually with a property rule. 00
b. Evaluation of Bargaining Rules
Bargaining rules exist to restrict the parties' ability to act strategi-
cally. Because bargaining rules allow either side to impose costs on the
other (through strikes and lockouts), both sides have an incentive not to
behave strategically. This ability of either party to punish strategic be-
havior can result in a harmonious long-term contracting relationship.
agreement, they are protected by liability rules. See supra note 83.
" See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962) (quoting NLRA § 8(d), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) 1982)); Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 348-49 (same). By contrast,
under property rule protection, the holder of the entitlement has no duty to entertain
offers to sell the entitlement.
8 See American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (upholding
employer's right to lock out the union after negotiations have reached impasse if the
purpose of the lockout is to bring to bear economic pressure on the union); NLRB v
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344 (1938) (noting that a union may law-
fully strike as a consequence of a current labor dispute).
" See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) ("[Alllowing the
Board to compel agreement . . . would violate the fundamental premise on which the
Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure
alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.")
100 See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) ("The duties imposed upon
employers, employees, and labor organizations. . . shall not be construed as requiring
either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions con-
tained in a contract for a fixed period . . ").
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Thus, bargaining rules are the keystone of the labor laws and are ap-
plied to a broad range of entitlements. 1 '
On the other hand, bargaining rules are a very costly form of enti-
tlement protection. In particular, the process of collective bargaining is
costly. Drafting an acceptable collective bargaining agreement involves
time, data collection, and legal expenses. More important, strikes and
lockouts-the results of failed negotiations-may impose significant
costs on both sides. In general, bargaining rules are rules governing
process and thus cannot ensure an efficient outcome.
An interesting issue involving the cost of bargaining rule protec-
tion concerns the degree to which each side must provide information to
the other during negotiations. 0 2 Although full information sharing may
seem attractive, such a rule would rarely be efficient. First, collecting
and sharing the relevant information creates direct costs. Second, the
distribution of product market information to the union increases the
risk of a leak of confidential data that could threaten a firm's profit
maximizing strategies. Third, and perhaps most important, once
equipped with the other side's information, each party is in a better
position to bargain strategically, since it will then be able to determine
the size of the quasi-rents it can expropriate.' 03 Accordingly, the effi-
101 The Board and the courts have interpreted "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment" broadly to include piecework and incentive pay plans, see
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, the effects of plant closings, see Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), group health insurance, see W.W. Cross & Co. v.
NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949); see also Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 159 (1971) (citing W.W. Cross with approval), store
operating hours, see Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676 (1965), safety rules, see NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.
1967), hiring practices, see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Hous-
ton Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 409 (1963), en-
forced sub nom. NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc.,
349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966), and dispute resolu-
tion provisions, see NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941). See gener-
ally R. GORMAN, supra note 69, at 496-509 (discussing mandatory subjects of
bargaining).
102 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1956) (holding that
employer committed unfair labor practice by claiming during negotiations that it could
not afford to pay higher wages, but refusing to produce information substantiating its
claim); Detroit Newspapers Printing & Graphic Communications Local 13, 233
N.L.R.B. 994, 995-96 (1977) (union has a similar duty to furnish information to em-
ployers). The types of information that employers must supply include, when relevant,
documentation of an argument that market forces dictate a bargaining position, wage
information, insurance plan cost information, job classifications and studies, and other
information regarding terms and conditions of employment. Unions have been required
to provide information regarding hiring hall and employment referral procedures, col-
lective bargaining agreements with other employers, and information pertinent to pen-
sion and welfare plans. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 69, at 621-
29.
103 One commentator argues that the provision of information actually reduces
costs, and suggests that the requirement of provision of information be extended: "Al-
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cient rule would not require full information disclosure but would in-
stead seek to limit actual disclosure and replace it with self-enforcing
contracts that disclose the relevant information indirectly.
3. The Timing of Entitlement Settings
Both bargaining rules and property rules are costly,'04 but there
are situations in which one rule is arguably more efficient than the
other.' 05 Two events in particular form a dividing line between use of
bargaining rules and use of property rules: the signing of the collective
though the bargaining requirement necessarily imposes some transaction costs on the
parties by requiring good faith bargaining until impasse, . . . the good faith standard's
requirement of information disclosure at the same time contains those transaction costs.
Required information disclosure severely limits much opportunistic bargaining." Note,
supra note 4, at 964 n.80. Even that student commentator, however, acknowledges that
opening up discussions before a proposed move may also reduce the pro-
ductivity of the employer's workforce simply by providing the workers
with notice of a possible plant closing. The most productive workers may
take quick advantage of their marketability and leave before the closing
would occur, and all workers, fearing imminent job loss, may devote more
attention to their possible forthcoming job search than to their current
jobs.
Id. at 958 n.57; see also id. at 960 ("The union could negotiate in an honest effort to
reach a mutually acceptable agreement or it could negotiate in an effort to forestall the
threatened shutdown or relocation while its members, unwilling to concede, begin their
job search."(citation omitted)).
Yet the commentator concludes that the requirement that the union bargain in
good faith, imposed by NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3), "ensures the 'quality'
of the union's intent to some extent and promotes mutually beneficial exchange." Id. at
964 n.79. There is no reason to believe, however, that a vague good faith requirement
would control strategic behavior by the union any more than it would control such
behavior by the firm. Rather, strategic behavior is more effectively controlled by con-
tractual terms that force both parties to reveal their private information through their
actions.
104 Not all commentators agree that bargaining rules are costly and so must be
restricted. See, e.g., Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1401, 1412 (1958) ("The cost [of bargaining] is so slight that the potential gains easily
justify legal compulsion to engage in the discussion.").
'05 The Supreme Court has taken such an efficiency approach to mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79
(1981). The Court stated:
The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collec-
tive discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons will result in
decisions that are better for both management and labor and for society as
a whole. . . . [I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decision-
making, bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial im-
pact on the continued availability of employment should be required only
if the benefit, for labor management relations and the collective-bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
Id. (citation omitted).
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bargaining agreement and an unanticipated change in economic
conditions.
a. Event 1: The Signing of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
During the contract formation process, bargaining rules
predominate. The signing of the collective bargaining agreement then
allocates entitlements previously protected by bargaining rules (the
mandatory subjects) as well as those previously protected by property
rules (the nonmandatory subjects). Once a collective agreement is
signed, however, all mandatory subjects of bargaining on which the
parties specifically reach agreement become protected by property
rules.' 0 6 Thus, no party can unilaterally modify or force bargaining
over a mandatory subject contained in the contract.
If, however, the collective agreement is silent regarding a
mandatory subject, bargaining rule protection still theoretically applies.
That is, "midterm bargaining," which occurs during the term of a col-
lective agreement, does not differ in any legal way from "endterm bar-
gaining," which occurs before the collective agreement is signed. The
practical differences, however, are great.1
0 7
These differences arise because the parties themselves typically
limit the application of bargaining rules midterm by writing property
rule protections into the agreements."0 8 Most collective agreements con-
tain no-strike clauses, which prohibit midterm strikes."0 9 Without the
ability to strike, the protection accorded to workers by a bargaining
rule is limited: a firm can satisfy its statutory obligations by bargaining
to impasse and then acting unilaterally without fear of direct
reprisal."0
A no-strike clause often accompanies an arbitration clause, which
requires that any dispute about the meaning of the collective agreement
be submitted to arbitration."' The union's ability to arbitrate midterm
substitutes to some degree for its foregone ability to strike midterm;
108 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
107 One practical difference is that endterm bargaining usually occurs in the con-
jectural stage. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
108 See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 69, at 604-06 (discussing the evolution
of "mature bargaining," which is characterized by contractual provisions for peaceful
dispute resolution).
109 See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 77:1 (1986).
110 See, e.g., Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967) ("[A]fter bar-
gaining to an impasse, that is, after good-faith negotiations have exhausted the pros-
pects of concluding an agreement, an employer does not violate the Act by making
unilateral changes that are reasonably within his pre-impasse proposals."), enforced
sub nom. AFTRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
1" See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:1 (1986).
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thus, the Supreme Court has called the arbitration clause a "quid pro
quo" for the no-strike clause." 2 But the substitution is not perfect; the
arbitrator cannot use bargaining rules and must rely instead only on
property rules and liability rules. Thus, the use of arbitration further
diminishes the practical role of mandatory midterm bargaining.
In addition to no-strike and arbitration clauses, the parties often
include broad zipper clauses, which attempt to prohibit bargaining over
any mandatory subject during the term of the collective agreement,
whether or not the parties actually considered the subject at endterm." 3
Most collective agreements also contain broad management rights
clauses, which purport to give the firm wide discretion to act unilater-
ally in areas not covered explicitly by the agreement." 4 Zipper clauses
and management rights clauses represent further attempts by the par-
ties to reduce the costs of mandatory bargaining by replacing bargain-
ing rules with property rules during the term of the collective
agreement.
The fact that parties so severely limit the force and application of
bargaining rules midterm suggests that property rule protection is gen-
erally more efficient midterm. The parties recognize that due to the
costs of bargaining rules, restricting their use to the discrete intervals
when the contract is open for renegotiation will ordinarily lead to joint
profits higher than when either side can force negotiations midterm.
Courts may have recognized this fact also. For example, if courts and
the Board read broadly the concept of an entitlement "contained in" the
agreement (so that an entitlement can be found in a broadly worded or
substantively related clause), then the use of midterm bargaining rules
can be minimized. The District of Columbia Circuit has taken such an
approach to midterm entitlements in its Milwaukee Spring II.. deci-
sion, discussed in the last Section of this Article."'
b. Event 2: Material Change in Economic Conditions
The second event that triggers a restriction of bargaining rules is a
material change in economic conditions, such as a recession. Before the
parties know that a change will occur, they are in the "conjectural"
112 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567
(1960).
"3 See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 36:421 (1987).
114 See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:1 (1986).
15 UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) affg Milwaukee Spring Div.
of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984).
216 See infra notes 220-262 and accompanying text.
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stage in which they bargain about hypothetical occurrences. 117 In the
conjectural stage, mandatory bargaining is relatively efficient because it
provides a low-cost means for the parties to decide how to allocate fore-
seeable risks between themselves. Workers could, for example, insure
against future product market declines by offering concessions in return
for a job preservation clause or severance pay provision in the contract.
On the other hand, firms could provide for greater freedom to adjust
input costs during economic downturns by bargaining for a clause al-
lowing subcontracting or relocation of work. Since contracts embody the
parties' willingness to make tradeoffs, private entitlements established
by the parties in the conjectural stage pursuant to mandatory bargain-
ing will be superior to public determination of entitlements by the
Board or the courts.
In the "nonconjectural stage," on the other hand, an event has
occurred that is not explicitly provided for in the contract. In this stage,
the costs associated with mandatory bargaining become more burden-
some."' In the place of bargaining, therefore, the -contract should be
scrutinized to see how the parties implicitly allocated the losses in the
event of such contingencies. For example, the presence of a layoff
clause could be understood to mean that the firm is allowed to lay off
workers in response to an economic downturn, as long as the firm fol-
lows the seniority schedule in making these layoffs.
In summary, bargaining rules are generally the efficient default
settings at endterm and in conjectural cases. In contrast, property rules
are efficient default settings at midterm and in the nonconjectural stage,
so long as some provision is made to protect against strategic behavior.
That provision, the sunk-cost-loss rule, is the subject of the next Part.
II. THE FIRM'S ADAPTATION TO A DECLINE IN PRODUCT
MARKET CONDITIONS: AN INTERNAL LABOR MARKET APPROACH
This Part applies the internal labor market model to a problem
117 See Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 899 n.16 (1984) (concurrence of
Member Dennis) (distinguishing between situations in which the burdens imposed by
the terms are merely speculative and those in which a party makes a "nonconjectural
economically motivated decision" affecting the same subject matter). Economists would
use the terms "ex ante" and "ex post" to describe the conjectural and nonconjectural
stages.
8 The Supreme Court has recognized that "management may have great need
for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and exigencies. . ..
The employer also may have no feasible alternative to the closing, and even good-faith
bargaining over it may both be futile and cause the employer additional loss." First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 682-83 (1981) (footnote omitted).
These problems all relate to the nonconjectural stage.
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that has become increasingly important in labor law: the need for a
firm to respond to a decline in the product market through subcontract-
ing, partial closure, or work relocation. In the internal labor market
model, the firm's adaptation to changing market conditions raises the
inherent dilemma of efficient labor contracting posed in Part I. The
allocation of responsibilities that is most efficient is one that gives the
firm the entitlement to decide on the scale and scope of operations in
the depressed product market. That entitlement recognizes the firm's
cost advantage in gathering and adjusting to new product market infor-
mation. At the same time, the efficient entitlement must also restrict the
firm's ability to act strategically.
The "sunk-cost-loss rule," defined and explained in this Part, ac-
complishes the above task. The economic literature on efficient labor
market contracts suggests that the sunk-cost-loss rule is one of the effi-
cient, implicit contractual terms found throughout internal labor mar-
kets in both union and nonunion sectors."19 The rule can be interpreted
as one that the parties themselves would write in a low-transaction cost
setting. The rule permits changes that are consistent with joint profit
maximization, while preventing moves that are profitable to the firm
only because of strategic gains at the expense of the workers.
This Article maintains that the labor law rules governing subcon-
tracting, partial closure, and work relocation are compatible with the
sunk-cost-loss rule. Although it has not been explicitly stated by either
the Board or the courts, the rule explains the economic intuition under-
lying recent legal decisons120 Because the economic rule indicates a
common (if unrecognized) thread among recent major court and Board
decisions, a fuller understanding of it can better focus the legal analysis
of new cases.
A. The Sunk-Cost-Loss Rule
The sunk-cost-loss rule is a rule of thumb that assigns to firms the
entitlement to respond to changes in product market conditions, while
at the same time limiting the channels through which the firm can ad-
just to these changes. Under the sunk-cost-loss rule, the firm has broad
power to determine the scale and scope of its operations. The entitle-
"1 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
120 The sunk-cost-loss rule is neither a statutory nor a common law legal require-
ment. It is an efficient standard that has developed in the internal labor market as a
response to transaction costs inherent in the market. Thus, the term "rule" is used to
identify those transactions to which rational parties would agree in a low-transaction-
cost setting. For a discussion of how the rule is combined with labor law default set-
tings, see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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ment is intermediate, rather than absolute, because the firm must ac-
cept a sunk cost loss in the process of reducing its total labor costs, or
wage bill. a"'
The sunk cost loss suffered by the firm is the loss of expected prof-
its accruing to the firm's sunk investments in labor (through specific
training and monitoring) and in physical capital.122 The sunk-cost-loss
rule deters strategic behavior by both parties. The firm is less likely to
act strategically, by expropriating the workers' deferred compensation,
if in order to cut its wage bill the firm must simultaneously suffer lost
expected profits. In addition, workers are less likely to retaliate strate-
gically by increasing monitoring costs because the sunk cost loss in-
curred by the firm provides objective evidence to the workers that sup-
ports the firm's claim of a product market decline.
Ideally, workers would be able to verify a firm's sunk cost losses
by observing the reduced profits and output associated with a decline in
the firm's product market. But these changes may be difficult to mea-
sure directly. What can be verified are the sunk cost losses associated
with investments in the firm's inputs, which, when combined with the
firm's production technology, 123 create the output. The two main cate-
gories of inputs are labor, or total hours (H), and capital (K). Thus,
proxy variables representing H and K enable workers and adjudicative
bodies to test for lost profits without the need to examine the firm's
balance sheet.
A major variant of the sunk-cost-loss rule is the W * H test. The
W * H test requires the firm to reduce its wage bill (W * H) through
a reduction in total hours (H) rather than the wage rate (W). 24 The
firm can cut W without incurring a sunk cost loss; therefore, allowing
the firm to make unilateral changes in W would not deter strategic
behavior.
When a firm suffers a decline in the demand for its product, it
must retrench by cutting either output or marginal costs, or some com-
bination of the two. If marginal costs were reduced through a reduction
121 The wage bill is the product of the wage rate and the total hours worked at
that rate summed over the various rates existing in the firm.
122 Alternatively, a sunk cost loss is a loss of quasi-rents. See supra notes 43-45
and accompanying text.
123 In economics, the firm's technology is represented by the production function.
The production function takes a form similar to f(K,L) = Q, in which K and L
represent capital and labor respectively, Q represents output, and f represents the func-
tional form that captures the technological relationship between the firm's inputs and
outputs. See R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 10, at 55-56.
124 W is used herein to represent not only the literal wage rate, but also all other
forms of compensation. See generally id. at 21-24 (discussing wages and other forms of
compensation).
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in wage rates, profits and output could remain unchanged and the firm
would incur no sunk cost loss.'" 5 If the firm had the entitlement to cut
wages, therefore, it would have an incentive to fabricate or overstate the
decline in the demand for its product and could actually increase its
profits. Thus, the firm could behave strategically by seizing the de-
ferred compensation owed to its workers. Of course, the firm would not
lower wages below the opportunity wage (OW), net of the costs of
finding a new job, because the workers would then quit, but the firm
would have an incentive to lower W to just above OW.
If output were reduced, in contrast, then hours of work and profits
would decrease from previous levels and the firm would incur a sunk
cost loss. Since any overstatement of the degree of product market de-
cline would cause the firm to reduce its output and profits below profit-
maximizing levels, the firm is deterred from engaging in strategic over-
statement of a decline in its product market. In this sense, the sunk-
cost-loss rule has important self-enforcing qualities.
But a further restriction is needed. As shown in Figure 1, the firm
may employ experienced workers who are in the recoupment phase of
their investment in training and monitoring: those in the df region. And
the firm may also employ workers on whom the firm is recouping past
investments: those in the be region. Given an unrestricted entitlement to
decrease total H, the firm would likely lay off those in the ef (W>MP)
phase while retaining those in the be (MP>W) phase. Since the ef
workers are the highest wage workers, the consequence is that the firm
could reduce its average wage rate, thus disguising a reduction in W by
using its entitlement to set H.
To avoid this potential for strategic behavior in adjusting H, the
sunk-cost-loss rule forces the firm to follow a previously agreed upon
schedule, typically based on seniority, which provides an ordering of
layoffs. A seniority schedule requires the firm to lay off those workers
in whom the firm is investing or recouping before it can lay off those
workers who themselves are recouping. Thus, a seniority schedule ef-
fectively means that the firm increases its average wage as it makes
layoffs. Such seniority provisions control recalls as well as layoffs: if the
firm were to lay off senior workers owed deferred compensation, they
would have to be recalled first if the firm increased its output in a
future period.
The self-enforcing properties of the W * H test combined with the
seniority schedule can be seen by referring to Figure 1. The firm's po-
" On the other hand, workers who have made specific investments in their train-
ing with the firm do suffer a sunk cost loss when the firm unilaterally cuts W. See id.
at 130-31.
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tential sunk cost loss in Figure 1 is the loss of its investment in the ab
region and the return on its investment in the be region. The firm must
realize a loss on those workers before laying off the workers in the ef
region. The firm's potential sunk cost loss on workers in the be range
acts as a buffer protecting the vulnerable workers in the ef region.
As the next Section demonstrates, the W * H test combined with
the seniority schedule successfully distinguishes on-site subcontracting
(an impermissible cut in W) from partial closure (a permissible cut in
total H). In certain complex cases, however, the seniority schedule pro-
vides an incomplete buffer because it does not apply across all relevant
workers. These cases involve shifting work to an off-site subcontractor
or relocating work to a different plant. Because the seniority schedule
across plants is often incomplete, the firm may be able to disguise stra-
tegic cuts in W. That is, all workers, including those owed the most
deferred compensation (in the ef phase), might be laid off at one plant,
while workers on whom the firm is recouping (in the be phase) were
retained at a second plant or by a subcontractor. 126 The self-enforcing
properties of the W * H test are thus reduced in multiplant cases in
which the different plants are not connected by cross-plant seniority
provisions.
In these cases, a second test, the K test, is used to supplement the
W * H test. The K test focuses on physical capital (K) inputs, such as
plant and equipment. Under the K test, a firm is presumed to have
incurred a sufficient sunk cost loss when it loses the value of the capital
stock used by the workers in the affected plant."' The K test imposes a
second buffer, similar to that created by the seniority schedule: the firm
must lose the plant-specific value of its physical capital, that is, the
quasi-rents from this capital, before it can cut its labor costs.
The K test has self-enforcing properties similar to the W * H test.
In a conjectural setting, workers agree to deferred compensation while
the firm agrees to post a bond not only in the form of its investment
and return on junior workers in the plant, but also in the value of the
firm's physical capital used in the plant. The contract is self-enforcing
.2 The retained be workers at the second plant might be either workers already
employed there in the subcontracting case or workers transferred from the old plant in
the relocation case. For further discussion of this point in the context of relocation, see
infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
127 The firm need not completely abandon the physical capital. Typically, the firm
will sell the assets it plans not to use any longer. If the price the firm receives is
minimal, such as mere scrap value, the firm has suffered a sunk cost loss. However, the
higher the price the firm receives for its idled physical assets, the more likely it is that
the firm has not incurred a sunk cost loss. In the extreme, if the firm sells its physical
capital at a price sufficient to finance the replacement of this capital, it suffers no sunk
cost loss.
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to the extent that the buffers represented by both the junior workers
and the physical capital are greater than the deferred compensation
owed to the senior workers.
When a decline in the product market begins, the firm starts dis-
charging its junior workers as, at the same time, the economic value of
the firm's capital investment begins to decline. By the time the product
market has declined enough to lead to an H cut affecting workers in
the ef stage, the junior workers will have already been laid off and the
capital equipment will typically have a much reduced value; this means
the buffers will have vanished. Hence the W * H and K tests would be
satisfied when the firm has no junior workers remaining in the idled
plant and the remaining K equipment is not transferred to the new
plant, but is idled. Alternatively stated, relocation or off-site subcon-
tracting is more likely to be strategic to the extent that workers junior
to the senior worker at the first plant are retained at the subcontractor's
plant or transferred to the firm's second plant and capital equipment is
transferred or sold for close to its use value in the closed plant.
B. The Sunk-Cost-Loss Rule and the Protection of Default
Entitlements
The sunk-cost-loss rule is an economic rule, not a legal rule. Fash-
ioning labor law principles from the sunk-cost-loss rule requires inte-
grating the rule into the framework of default entitlement settings de-
veloped in the previous Part. Three cases must be differentiated:
conjectural cases; nonconjectural cases covered by the contract; and non-
conjectural cases not covered by the contract. The sunk-cost-loss rule
provides the legal default setting only for the third case: a nonconjec-
tural situation in which the collective agreement is either silent or
ambiguous.
The sunk-cost-loss rule plays no direct role in conjectural cases
because no sunk cost loss has yet occurred, and, in any case, there is
less need to restrict the use of bargaining rules. In the conjectural stage,
there is no issue of whether a product market decline has occurred;
both parties agree that they are bargaining over future contingencies.
Consequently, the firm has less asymmetric information that it can use
strategically. Additionally, the sunk-cost-loss rule does not affect cases
in which the collective agreement contains explicit allowances of or re-
strictions on the firm's means of adapting to product market conditions.
The parties may explicitly adopt or override the sunk-cost-loss rule in
the collective agreement. If the parties write explicit contingent agree-
ments in the conjectural stage, then, in the nonconjectural stage, the
Board and the courts protect with property rules the specific contingent
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entitlements "contained in" the collective bargaining agreement."2 The
contract terms must, however, be sufficiently specific in defining the
relevant contingency and the permitted response to ensure that the
terms show a conscious attempt by the parties to create contingent
entitlements. 2
C. Objections to the Sunk-Cost-Loss Rule
Several possible objections to the sunk-cost-loss rule merit discus-
sion. The first objection is that, under certain conditions, the sunk-cost-
loss rule might not be self-enforcing and hence would not deter all stra-
tegic labor cost cutting by the firm. Such a problem would occur, for
example, if the contract between the firm and the older workers con-
tained insufficient buffer protection when it was originally signed.
The major safeguard against such occurrence is that a union, as
the bargaining representative of the workers, is unlikely to sign such
one-sided agreements in the conjectural stage. An additional safeguard
is that if the product market decline is not too sudden and unantici-
pated, then even in the nonconjectural stage the workers will have op-
portunities to escape from anticipated future losses in deferred compen-
sation by bargaining for higher current wages, higher severance pay,
supplementary unemployment benefits, or other clauses that raise the
costs that the firm faces when laying off workers. Moreover, the sunk-
cost-loss rule is not the only deterrent of strategic behavior. The firm's
reputational effects deter some strategic behavior. Firms that develop a
reputation for strategic behavior will find that workers are unwilling to
accept contracts containing deferred compensation. As a result, the
firm's monitoring costs and training costs would increase, and its ability
to hire high-quality workers would decrease. 3 Although reputational
effects will not deter a firm that completely closes its operations, they
will deter firms that have other plants or other operations at the same
plant. Finally, the Board and courts can further deter strategic behavior
128 See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (statute "shall not be construed
as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and condi-
tions contained in a contract for a fixed period"); supra note 100 and accompanying
text.
129 Compare Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1660 (1965) (employer action up-
held because management rights clause specifically allowed the action to be taken) with
Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874, 877-78 (3d Cir. 1968) (mere catchall
phrase in the contract was not sufficiently clear and unmistakable to indicate that union
relinquished rights).
130 See R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, supra note 10, at 406-07; Carmichael, Rep-
utations in the Labor Market, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 723 (1984).
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by determining that a firm's actions are due to antiunion animus. 3 1
When a firm's actions are motivated by a desire to replace union work-
ers, absent a business justification, the doctrine of antiunion animus
could be applied to prevent the firm's actions. This protection may be
particularly important in cases involving new unions that are negotiat-
ing their first contract.
A second objection to the sunk-cost-loss rule is that even if it deters
all strategic behavior by the firm, it still may provide insufficient pro-
tection for the workers. This objection has an efficiency prong and an
equity prong. The efficiency prong stems from the fact that business
cycle fluctuations pose risks that workers may want to insure against,
even if they are assured that the firm is not behaving strategically."3 2
Either the parties in their collective agreement or the law through de-
fault settings must allocate the risk of economic downturns. Thus, risk
bearing is a separate issue independent of the potential for strategic
behavior.
Although a separate issue, the allocation of risk is determined
jointly by the same contractual provisions and legal default settings that
limit the firm's entitlement to adjust to product market declines. Specif-
ically, the parties themselves allocate risk when they write seniority
provisions, severance pay clauses, or other such mechanisms for com-
pensating laid off workers. 33 Similarly, the law, by preserving a duty
to bargain over effects,"3 or sometimes by implying severance provi-
sions,"3 5 provides insurance protection to workers.
131 See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965)
("[A] partial closing is an unfair labor practice ... if motivated by a purpose to chill
unionism in any of the remaining plants . . . if the employer may reasonably have
foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect."); NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982) (It is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to...
discourage membership in any labor organization.").
132 For a general discussion of the economics of risk and insurance, see A. POLIN-
SKY, supra note 1, at 51-56. Workers may want to insure against business risks be-
cause they have fewer opportunities to diversify than participants in financial markets.
See supra note 34.
133 See M. STONE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS AT WORK 9 (1961); see
also 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 53:1-2 (1986) (among employment
contracts sampled, 52% provided for some income maintenance, but only 25% of non-
manufacturing contracts and only 6% of manufacturing contracts guaranteed work orpay).
134 "Effects bargaining" will be discussed in the next Part. See infra notes 197-
200 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 243 F. Supp. 205, 212
(D.N.J. 1965) (summary judgment denied on issue of whether, absent a substantive
provision regarding severance pay in the collective bargaining agreement, there existed
"an implied covenant [for the employer] to pay wages to employees after plant closure
prior to expiration of the term of the collective bargaining agreement").
[Vol. 136:1349
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Although these provisions reduce risk, they do not completely
eliminate it because of moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when an
individual is insured against a risk, and therefore has incentives to se-
lect the less costly option of not taking further precautions to reduce the
probability of the risk occurring. In particular, workers fully insured
against layoff would have an incentive to shirk on the job because they
would be just as well off if they lost their jobs as if they kept them.
The equity prong of the objection that the sunk-cost-loss rule in-
sufficiently protects workers is that the rule insufficiently protects
union wage gains. There are several responses to this objection. First, it
can be argued that the NLRA seeks to protect only "competitive," not
cartelized, wage rates.' 36 By creating a statutory scheme that does not
compel unionization, Congress forced unions and unionized firms to
compete in the market place against the nonunion sector. High union
wage premiums (unrelated to deferred compensation) can lead to nega-
tive economic profits for unionized firms and the flow of capital from
the unionized to the nonunionized sector. Thus, if the intent of the
NLRA is that the unionized sector survive and compete successfully in
the marketplace, union wage premiums cannot be fully protected.
The second response is that internal labor markets seek to protect
only the competitive returns accruing to monitoring and specific train-
ing. The higher the wage, the more likely it is that the firm, rather
than the worker, is incurring those investment costs. In the extreme, if
the wage is so high that unionized workers' wages exceed their oppor-
tunity wages throughout the job life cycle, then the workers have made
no investments that need to be protected from strategic behavior. In
construing collective bargaining agreements, one must consider not only
the wage term itself, but also the terms that were explicitly or implic-
itly traded away to secure the wage term. In particular, wages can be
viewed as implicitly traded off against employment security.137 The
lower the wage, the lower the firm's costs. Low cost status helps to
protect the firm from the worst effects of business cycle fluctuations. In
addition, the lower the firm's wage costs, the more likely the firm is to
retain workers during declines. Thus, in bargaining for high present
wages rather than investing in their specific training or monitoring,
138 See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (describing the inequality of bargain-
ing power that "prevent[s] the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working con-
ditions within and between industries").
137 Wages may also be traded against an employer's bad reputation. Suppose that
a firm has a reputation for acting strategically. Workers might respond by writing high
present-wage contracts rather than contracts containing deferred compensation.
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workers may be viewed as implicitly trading away the higher degree of
job security to which deferred compensation would entitle them.
III. AN APPLICATION OF THE SUNK-COST-Loss RULE TO
LEADING LABOR LAW CASES
This Part analyzes several major cases involving subcontracting
work, partially closing a plant, and relocating plant operations.138 They
all occur in the nonconjectural stage and involve economically based
decisions costly to union workers but unmarred by antiunion animus.
The following discussion will point out the underlying economic
logic that supports these decisions and will demonstrate how future
lawmakers may approach the problem in a more explicitly consistent
and economically coherent manner. Most of the cases reach the result
that would have been achieved if the Board and the courts had explic-
itly used the sunk-cost-loss rule. This fact is not surprising if, as this
Article has argued, labor law is largely concerned with the efficient
functioning of internal labor markets.
A. The Supreme Court Framework
The Supreme Court has twice addressed the scope, absent a con-
travening agreement, of management prerogatives to respond to product
market declines. 13 In Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,'40 the
Court held that at least some subcontracting was subject to mandatory
bargaining. Seventeen years later, in First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB,"" the Court held that the partial closure of a business
1"S For an excellent survey of NLRB and court decisions in this area, see P. Mis-
CIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: PLANT CLOSINGS, RELOCA-
TIONS, SUBCONTRACTING, AND AUTOMATION (1983). Unfortunately, this study pre-
dates Otis Elevator II, 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984), and Milwaukee Spring II, 268
N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), affd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
the two relocation, cases discussed in this Article.
"' In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2214 (1987), the Su-
preme Court upheld a Maine law requiring employers that terminate operations at
plants with 100 or more employees or that relocate those operations more than 100
miles away to "provide one week's pay for each year of employment to all employees
who have worked in the plant at least three years." Id.
This Article does not address the issue of state laws designed to supplant the de-
fault settings of federal labor laws and to replace federal laws with their own default
settings. The Maine law, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (Supp. 1986-87),
however, is consistent with the sunk-cost-loss rule in that it does not interfere with the
employer's decision but instead mandates certain "default effects," which overwrite the
federal default setting of effects bargaining and which the parties may in turn overwrite
in the collective agreement.
140 379 U.S. 203, 209 (1964).
141 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
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was an entitlement belonging to the firm and protected by a property
rule. Although many commentators have struggled to reconcile these
two cases,1" 2 the internal labor market model and the sunk-cost-loss
rule provide a justification for the decisions in these cases and also for
much of the analysis used by the Court.
1. Fibreboard
In Fibreboard, a firm decided to subcontract for plant mainte-
nance work upon expiration of its collective bargaining agreement,
which provided for automatic renewal absent notice to modify or termi-
nate the contract. The union workers had performed the maintenance
work for over twenty years. The firm claimed that the maintenance
work had become too costly and that an independent contractor could
do the work more cheaply. The firm did not consult or bargain with
the union about its decision to subcontract nor did it give the contractu-
ally required notice.1 3
The Supreme Court held that the firm committed an unfair labor
practice by not bargaining over the subcontracting decision, which the
142 Two commentators reconcile the cases in ways similar to this Article's ap-
proach. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 1022 (requiring mandatory bargaining over
subcontracting decisions, but over only the effects of partial closure, correctly balances
labor's interest in making the demand for labor less elastic with management's interest
in restricting production to optimal levels); Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-
Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA.
L. REV. 1447, 1463-64 (1982) ("decisions concerning how employers are to compensate
organized laborers from the wealth generated by their work" differs from "decisions
concerning what goods will be produced and offered to which markets"; the former are
for bargaining, the latter only for management response to consumer preferences).
For general discussion and criticism of the First National Maintenance decision,
see The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 329 (1981); Comment,
Job Security, Managerial Prerogatives, and First National Maintenance, 31 BUFFALO
L. REV. 509, 521-46 (1982); Comment, Labor Law-The Employer's Duty to Bargain
over a Decision to Close Part of Its Business, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 185, 185-95
(1981); Note, Collective Bargaining over Plant Relocation Decisions: Let's Make a
Deal, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 715, 732-40 (1983); Note, Labor Law-A Balancing of
Interests Test Applied to the Duty to Bargain About a Partial Closing Decision: First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 61 N.C.L. REV. 365, 365-77 (1983); Note,
Employer's Duty to Bargain with Respect to Partial Termination of Business: First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 36 Sw. L.J..793, 801-05 (1982); Note, Enforc-
ing the NLRA: The Need for a Duty to Bargain over Partial Plant Closings, 60 TEx.
L. REV. 279, 292-302 (1982); Note, Labor Law-An Employer's Decision to Termi-
nate Partially a Business Operation Is Not a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining, 56
TUL. L. REv. 1065, 1074-82 (1982); Comment, Labor Law: An Employer's Duty to
Bargain Concerning the Decision to Terminate Part of a Business, 34 U. FLA. L.
REV. 292, 292-303 (1982); Note, supra note 4, at 951-68.
"' See Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 205-06. The union, however, did give timely no-
tice of its desire to modify the contract. See id. at 205. Thus, the contract was due to
expire at the-time the dispute arose, making the case an endterm case.
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Court deemed a mandatory subject of bargaining. 44  Although the
Court made several arguments in support of its conclusion,'45 the heart
of the opinion recognized the economic effect of subcontracting:
The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance
work did not alter the Company's basic operation. The
maintenance work still had to be performed in the plant. No
capital investment was contemplated; the Company merely
replaced existing employees with those of an independent
contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment. 4
Thus, the Court focused on the fact that the subcontracting at issue
merely substituted cheaper nonunion labor for more expensive union
labor at no additional cost to the firm.1
4 7
In an influential concurrence, Justice Stewart accepted this eco-
nomic interpretation of the firm's subcontracting decision. According to
Justice Stewart, "All that is involved is the substitution of one group of
workers for another to perform the same task in the same plant under
the ultimate control of the same employer."' 4' Nevertheless, Justice
Stewart attempted to limit some of the broad language in the majority
opinion. 4 9 He argued that mandatory bargaining rules should not be
applied to managerial decisions that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control,"' 5 including decisions concerning "what shall be produced,
how capital shall be invested in fixed assets, or what the basic scope of
the enterprise shall be."''
144 See id. at 209.
145 The Court first stated that the subcontracting at issue fell within the literal
meaning of "terms and conditions of employment" under § 8(d). Id. at 210. Second,
the Court noted that requiring mandatory bargaining in this case would further the
purposes of the Act by promoting "the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes"
through negotiation. Id. at 210-11. Third, the Court looked to industrial practice and
found that subcontracting was addressed successfully in many collective agreements. See
id. at 211-12. Fourth, the Court found the case to be merely an extension of Local 24,
Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294-95 (1959), which held piecemeal
subcontracting to be subject to mandatory bargaining. See Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 212-
13.
"I Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213, quoted in First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at
679-80.
147 The Court explicitly declined to extend its holding to "other forms" of subcon-
tracting. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 215.
14 Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
149 Justice Stewart worried that "there are passages in the Court's opinion today
which ... seem[] to imply that any issue which may reasonably divide an employer
and his employees must be the subject of compulsory collective bargaining." Id. at 221
(Stewart, J., concurring).
10 Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
151 Id. at 225 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). At another point, Jus-
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In the context of the internal labor market model presented in the
last two Parts, both opinions in Fibreboard are consistent with the
sunk-cost-loss rule. The economic effect of the subcontracting in
Fibreboard is a cut in the wage rate (W) without a reduction in total
hours (H).152 Although the firm reduces the hours of work of its own
workers, it maintains H and hence its total output and revenue by buy-
ing labor services through a subcontractor. In addition, although the
firm does not change the wage rate it pays to its remaining workers,
substituting the lower wage employees of a subcontractor to do the
"same work under similar conditions of employment" effectively
reduces the firm's average W across total H. By reducing the average
wage rate and maintaining total hours (including those of the subcon-
tractor), a firm engaged in such subcontracting violates the W * H test
and therefore the sunk-cost-loss rule.1
5 3
The critical point is that the subcontracting firm can cut labor
costs without incurring any sunk cost losses. Because the potential for
strategic behavior in such a situation is great, the parties in a low
transaction cost setting would not assign to the firm the unilateral right
to engage in Fibreboard-type subcontracting. Thus, the default setting
implied by the sunk-cost-loss rule would be a bargaining rule and not a
property rule entitlement allowing the firm to subcontract in this way.
Justice Stewart's concurrence, however, implicitly recognizes that
tice Stewart's concurrence also includes "those management decisions which are funda-
mental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise." Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added). Justice Stewart's concurrence does not define "scope" and
"direction," but it is likely that he intended what economists define as "scale" and
"scope," respectively. Scale ("scope" in Justice Stewart's terminology) refers to the size
of the enterprise, while scope (Justice Stewart's "direction") refers to the number of
different types of products produced, as well as the production technology used.
From an economic standpoint, Justice Stewart's "scope and direction" test largely
parallels the W * H and K tests of the sunk-cost-loss rule. A change in scope can be
interpreted as a cut in H; a change in direction as a loss of K. Justice Stewart's test
departs from the majority opinion, which states at one point that the economies that
"could be derived by reducing the work force . . . have long been regarded as matters
peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework." Id. at
213-14.
.52 See id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring) (Fibreboard involved only the substitu-
tion of one workforce for another, resulting in a lower wage rate).
113 The Court's decision limited the union's default entitlement, however, to one
protected by a bargaining rule. See id. at 210. The Court could have decided that the
union had a property rule entitlement to prevent the firm from subcontracting. There
are several possible reasons that the Court did not give a property rule entitlement to
the union. First, the case occurred endterm, and bargaining rules are relatively more
efficient than property rules at endterm, see supra notes 106-16 and accompanying
text. Second, the Court may have feared that providing the union with a property rule
entitlement in the nonconjectural stage would enable the union to extract high conces-
sions from the firm in return for allowing subcontracting that posed no threat of strate-
gic behavior by the firm.
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subcontracting can be a nonstrategic means of adjustment and that,
consistent with the sunk-cost-loss rule, there may be situations in which
a firm contemplating subcontracting to reduce its labor costs could be
deterred from behaving strategically. For example, if the subcontracting
results in a change "in the basic scope of the enterprise" (a reduction in
H in our terminology), the firm might incur a sunk cost loss large
enough to verify that the subcontracting was efficient rather than stra-
tegic. Similarly, if a change in "invest[ment] in fixed assets"1 4 accom-
panies the subcontracting, the firm may suffer a substantial sunk cost
loss from outdated physical capital that the firm abandons or sells at a
value substantially below replacement cost. In contrast, if a firm were
allowed to replace senior workers at its plant with junior workers of
the subcontractor, or transfer all of its physical capital to the subcon-
tractor, there would be neither a change in basic direction nor an in-
vestment in fixed assets and thus no sunk cost loss. Presumably Justice
Stewart would have construed this type of subcontracting as a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
2. First National Maintenance
The second Supreme Court case, First National Maintenance,
confirmed the Court's implied willingness to allow a firm to act unilat-
erally in response to market declines when the firm incurs a sunk cost
loss. First National Maintenance, which performed maintenance ser-
vices for other businesses,' 55 laid off all the workers assigned to a nurs-
ing home when First National terminated its maintenance contract
with the home. The cancellation of the contract resulted not directly
from labor costs, but from a dispute over the amount of the fee to be
paid above labor costs. Although the newly elected bargaining represen-
tative requested bargaining over First National's decision to terminate
the nursing home contract, First National refused.' 56
The Supreme Court held that First National did not have to bar-
gain over the "decision" to terminate the maintenance contract with the
nursing home and to lay off the workers employed under that con-
tract. '5 In making this determination, the Court found controlling the
fact that the firm's decision "involv[ed] a change in the scope and direc-
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 225 (Stewart, J., concurring).
It is interesting to note that First National Maintenance presents a fact pat-
tern that is almost a mirror image of Fibreboard. First National was in the role of a
subcontracting maintenance company, like the firm the Fibreboard employees were
hoping to stave off.
ISG First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 668-70.
157 Id. at 686.
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tion of the enterprise." '158 On the other hand, the Court ruled that the
firm had to bargain over the "effects" of the partial closing." 9
Thus, the Court gave the firm an entitlement protected by a prop-
erty rule to lay off workers when it partially closed its operations.
Largely adopting Justice Stewart's analysis in Fibreboard,160 the Court
formulated the following balancing test: "bargaining over management
decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-manage-
ment relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the bur-
den placed on the conduct of the business. )161
In applying this test, the Court can be viewed as having implicitly
analyzed the costs of bargaining rules compared with those of property
rules in nonconjectural cases. The Court discussed three ways in which
property rule entitlements were relatively less costly than bargaining
rules."62 First, the Court recognized the potential for strategic behavior
by the union under a bargaining rule: "Labeling this type of decision
mandatory could afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a
power that might be used to thwart management's intentions in a man-
ner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose."1 ' Sec-
ond, the Court acknowledged management's "need for speed, flexibility,
and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and exigencies,"' " which
mandatory bargaining and its informational requirements would render
difficult. Finally, the Court noted the remaining protections available to
the union under a property rule, such as effects bargaining, mandatory
bargaining in the conjectural stage, and prohibition of decisions based
on antiunion animus.
65
Given this implicit balancing of property rules versus bargaining
rules, the Court attempted to distinguish the partial closure situation in
First National Maintenance from the subcontracting decision in
168 Id. at 677.
159 Id. at 677 n.15 & 681. First National did not dispute the NLRB's conclusion
that it had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain over effects and in
fact reached agreement with the union on severance pay. See id. at 678 n.15.
160 See id. at 677. The Court also relied in part on the analysis of the Fibreboard
majority. See id. at 679-80 (noting the Court's implicit recognition of the employer's
freedom to make management decisions).
11 Id. at 679.
162 Cf supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (discussing the transaction costs
of negotiations, use of economic weapons, and required provision of information).
163 First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S at 683.
164 Id. at 682-83.
165 See id. at 681-82. In addition, the Court, as in Fibreboard, looked to indus-
trial practice and found that "provisions giving unions a right to participate in the
decisionmaking process concerning alteration of the scope of an enterprise appear to be
relatively rare." Id. at 684.
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Fibreboard. The Court argued that the "decision to halt work at this
specific location represented a significant change in petitioner's opera-
tions, a change not unlike opening a new line of business or going out
of business entirely." 66 The Court contrasted such a decision with a
decision "to replace the discharged employees or to move that operation
elsewhere";16 the Court, however, did not explain satisfactorily the ba-
sis for its distinction.
In particular, the Court was unclear about the issue of "labor
costs." On the one hand, the Court stated that "a desire to reduce labor
costs," as in Fibreboard, is "'peculiarly suitable for resolution within
the collective bargaining framework.' "168 On the other hand, the Court
maintained that "[i]f labor costs are an important factor in a failing
operation and the decision to close, management will have an incentive
"169to confer voluntarily with the union to seek concessions ....
While the former statement is consistent with the economic rule,70 the
latter argument is troubling. Part of the problem is that these argu-
ments focus on the wrong question. The relevant issue is whether the
firm is potentially acting strategically in cutting its labor costs, not
whether the firm has an incentive to bargain.
The sunk-cost-loss rule articulates the distinction that provides a
principled rationale for the Court's ruling in First National Mainte-
nance. The economic effect of a partial closure is to cut the level of
employment, and therefore the level of production. This drop in pro-
duction makes the partial closure similar to "going out of business" and
"16 Id. at 688.
167 Id. at 687.
18 Id. at 680 (quoting Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 214). Conversely, the Court stated
that if labor costs are not "a crucial circumstance in a particular economically based
partial termination ...the Board's traditional remedies may well be futile." Id. at
685. Thus, because the dispute was "solely over the size of the management fee," id. at
687, requiring bargaining would not have helped the union. The dissent correctly re-
butted this argument by noting that "[e]ven where labor costs are not the direct cause of
a company's financial difficulties, employee concessions can often enable the company
to continue in operation . . . ." Id. at 690 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Professor Gorman, in his critique of First National Maintenance, ar-
gues that "all of the respondent's investment consisted of its labor costs (even the tools,
equipment, and materials were furnished by the nursing home), concerning which the
workers and the union had an indisputable influence." Gorman, The Negligible Impact
of the National Labor Relations Act on Managerial Decisions to Close or Relocate, 58
TUL. L. REV. 1354, 1362 (1984). Although these are valid criticisms, they lead only to
disagreement with the Court's reasoning in this instance, not with its conclusion.
"I First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682.
170 The consistency depends on how labor costs are defined, however. The Court
cited Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213-14, in which the Court included reductions in work
force as an example of a decision particularly suitable for bargaining. See First Nat'l
Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 680. If labor cost reduction includes work force reduction,
the Court's statement is not fully consistent with the sunk-cost-loss rule.
[Vol. 136:1349
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
not similar to "replacing discharged employees." Both subcontracting
and partial closure reduce the wage bill (W * H), but Fibreboard-type
subcontracting does it by reducing the wage rate (W), while partial
closure does it by reducing the size of the labor force (H) in accordance
with the seniority schedule. Thus, only partial closure satisfies the W *
H test.
171
It is worth noting that the facts in First National Maintenance
are unusual because First National's technology required almost no
capital.1 7 '2 First National's workers used the equipment owned by the
customer on that customer's premises. 17  Although atypical, the facts in
First National Maintenance suggest that the firm's decision was effi-
cient rather than strategic. First, there was little doubt that First Na-
tional had in fact suffered a product market decline. The firm lost a
customer, the nursing home, and by cutting the H associated with that
customer, the firm suffered a sunk cost loss on whatever investments it
did make in its workers and capital. Second, there was no evidence that
the firm used this lost contract as a subterfuge to avoid deferred com-
pensation. In fact, it is possible that there was little deferred compensa-
tion owed to the workers, in which case the gains from strategic behav-
171 Professor Campbell comes close to stating this distinction between subcontract-
ing and partial closure in his brief discussion of Fibreboard and First Nat'l Mainte-
nance. In attempting to reconcile the two cases from an economic perspective, he argues
that workers "should be allowed to bargain over issues concerning substitution for labor
in production, but should not be allowed to influence product market decisions, such as
how much output is manufactured." Campbell, supra note 4, at 1022. Nevertheless,
Campbell's focus is different from that of this Article. He frames his economic ap-
proach to labor law around the question of the scope of monopoly power accorded to
unions rather than around the minimization of strategic behavior in internal labor mar-
kets through efficient contracting. See id. at 1005-06.
In addition, Professor Harper advocates a rule he calls the "product market prin-
ciple" which would exclude from mandatory bargaining "all decisions to determine
what products are created and sold, in what quantities, for which markets, and at
what prices." Harper, supra note 142, at 1463. Applying this rule to First Nat'l
Maintenance, Harper argues that the Court's decision was correct because the partial
termination constituted the withdrawal of a product from the market. See id. at 1469.
Harper distinguishes Fibreboard subcontracting because it "do[es] not change the na-
ture of the good that the contracting employer ultimately offers to the market." Id. at
1475. Although Harper's analysis is close to that of this Article, it is closer to Camp-
bell's analysis in that its roots are in antitrust principles rather than internal labor
market principles.
17 Professor Gorman, for one, finds decisive "the fact that the respondent's deci-
sions in no way affected the investment or withdrawal of capital, the basic scope and
direction of the enterprise, and similar factors so prominently mentioned in Fibreboard
. .." Gorman, supra note 168, at 1362. In this Article's view, a cut in H is as much
a change in the "scope and direction" of an enterprise as a change in K and usually
ensures a sufficient sunk cost loss, although, in a more complex situation involving
combinations of cuts in W and H, the absence of a K loss could make the case more
difficult.
173 See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 668.
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ior would have been slight.174 Third, although the union was newly
formed at the time of the dispute, and thus the partial closure could
have been the result of antiunion animus (the Court left open this pos-
sibility), there was no evidence of this problem on the facts presented.
Finally, any remaining potential for strategic behavior was mitigated
by the Court's affirmation of mandatory bargaining over effects.
3. Summary of Supreme Court Framework
The Court's framework establishes that in nonconjectural,
endterm cases, labor law awards a property rule entitlement to the firm
when the firm adjusts to product market declines by cutting total hours
of work in accordance with a seniority schedule. Alternatively, a bar-
gaining rule applies in nonconjectural, endterm cases in which the firm
adjusts by effectively cutting the wage rate through subcontracting.
Fibreboard-type subcontracting is therefore a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, but First National Maintenance-type partial closure is not.
In formulating the default entitlements in these two cases, the
11" Professor Alchian, discussing First National Maintenance from an economic
perspective, concludes that the workers probably had not invested in specific training.
More precisely, he argues that any specific quasi-rents (returns to specific training)
owing to the workers were not created in response to offers by the firm to invest in such
specific training. Thus, Professor Alchian argues that the workers did not have any
interest that needed to be protected. See Alchian, supra note 4, at 244-45.
Although this Article shares Professor Alchian's focus on internal labor markets, it
disagrees with the implications of his analysis of First National Maintenance. Al-
chian's analysis implies a rule based on the presence or absence of investments in spe-
cific training. In contrast, this Article adopts a rule based on the presence or absence of
a sunk cost loss. The sunk-cost-loss rule is closer to the Supreme Court framework.
Moreover, it is more efficient than the "specific training rule," which, standing alone,
is both underprotective and overprotective of workers in the internal labor market.
The specific training rule is underprotective because it fails to recognize that any
deferred compensation, even when not related to specific training, gives rise to the po-
tential for strategic behavior by the firm. Deferred compensation need not be associated
with specific training, but may be related to monitoring or take the form of the mobility
or search costs saved when workers remain at their current jobs. Under the sunk-cost-
loss rule, a cut in W to avoid deferred compensation is impermissible even if there is no
evidence of investment in specific training. In contrast, the specific training rule appar-
ently would have allowed First National to engage in Fibreboard-type subcontracting
because the workers had no protectable interest. Thus, such a rule fails to reconcile
Fibreboard and First National Maintenance.
The specific training rule is also overprotective of workers in cases of true product
market decline because it fails to recognize the firm's need to respond efficiently to
changes in the product market. Under the sunk-cost-loss rule, a cut in H in accordance
with the seniority schedule assures that the firm is taking a loss. Therefore, such a cut
is permissible even if the laid off workers had made some investments in specific train-
ing. In contrast, the specific training rule would have prohibited the partial closure had
there been evidence of investment in specific training. It is difficult to reconcile this
result with either the Supreme Court's analysis or efficient contracting principles.
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Court was sensitive to how the parties themselves would allocate the
entitlements. In both cases, the Court referred to industrial practice in
making its decision. 17 5 Under the Court's analysis, when a contract
term is widely used, a court can use that contract term as a first ap-
proximation to the default settings that the parties themselves would
have established. This approach is entirely consistent with the economic
approach to labor law developed herein."' In addition, this Article has
provided an economic rationale for those relevant stylized, or widely
used contract terms, found in internal labor markets.
The rules applicable to these cases do not apply when the parties
are in the conjectural stage or when the collective agreement contains a
pertinent provision. Bargaining rules predominate in the conjectural
stage. Thus, a union wanting to bargain for a work preservation clause
that prevented a future partial closure during the term of the contract
could insist on such a clause until impasse resulted. Moreover, entitle-
ments created by the collective agreement itself are enforced as specified
in the contract, even if they override the sunk-cost-loss rule, since the
sunk-cost-loss rule is merely a property rule default setting. Thus, if
the union agrees to a provision permitting Fibreboard-type subcon-
tracting, it must abide by this agreement.
B. Subcontracting and Partial Closure Under the Supreme Court
Framework
Given the Fibreboard and First National Maintenance dichot-
omy, the Board has been faced with the task of distinguishing labor cost
cutting governed by bargaining rules from that governed by property
rules. It has had to address essentially two types of cases: subcontract-
ing that closely resembles a "partial closure" of the firm's operations
and relocation of firm work to another one of its own plants. Thus far,
the Board has struggled to fashion a workable analysis from the two
Supreme Court cases. This Section applies the sunk-cost-loss rule to
some of the recent subcontracting cases. The following Section exam-
ines the Supreme Court's framework for the relocation issue.
175 See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 684 (The Court found it significant
that "provisions giving unions a right to participate in the decisionmaking process con-
cerning alteration of the scope of an enterprise appear to be relatively rare. Provisions
concerning notice and 'effects' are more prevalent."); Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 211-12
(The Court stated that, "[w]hile not determinative, it is appropriate to look to indus-
trial bargaining practices in appraising the propriety of including a particular subject
within the scope of mandatory bargaining.").
21 But see Alchian, supra note 4, at 237-38 (arguing that the focus should be on
implicit understandings between disputing parties, not on provisions in typical
contracts).
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One year after First National Maintenance, the Board, in Bob's
Big Boy Family Restaurants,' had occasion to analyze the effect of
that opinion on subcontracting decisions. Bob's Big Boy involved a res-
taurant chain that owned a "commissary" plant, which prepared and
distributed food for the firm's restaurants. One of the departments in
the plant was the shrimp processing department, whose employees were
responsible for cutting, breading, and packaging shrimp. Because of
"the escalating market price of raw shrimp and the problems encoun-
tered in . . .portion control,"' 8 Bob's decided to purchase processed
shrimp from an outside firm. Bob's laid off the shrimp processing em-
ployees, converted the processing area to storage, returned its cutting
machines to the lessor, sold its breading machines to the subcontractor,
and modified its oil hydraulic system for use in another department.
The firm did not bargain with the union over this decision or its effects.
The Board majority held that the firm violated section 8(a)(5) by
failing to bargain with the union about the decision to subcontract.'7
The majority found the situation more like the subcontracting in
Fibreboard than the partial closure in First National Maintenance,
because the firm "still supplies processed shrimp to its constituent res-
taurants. The only difference is that the processing work is now per-
formed by [the subcontractor's] employees . . . . Accordingly, the na-
ture and direction of [Bob's] business was not substantially altered by
the subcontract. '"1 0 Thus, even though the firm itself "closed down the
shrimp processing operation,"'' as the dissent maintained, the firm did
not change the production level of processed shrimp that it ultimately
supplied to its restaurants.'8s
The majority's analysis comports with the sunk-cost-loss rule.
Bob's Big Boy was cutting its labor costs without cutting back its scale
of operations. The firm's decision, therefore, did not meet the W * H
test and was not a partial closure in the First National Maintenance
17 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
178 Id. at 1369.
"' The majority also upheld the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Bob's
violated § 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain over the effects of its decision to discontinue its
shrimp processing operation. See id.
180 Id. at 1371 (footnote omitted).
... Id. at 1373 (Van de Water & Hunt, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
182 The majority also noted that Bob's primary concerns in deciding to subcon-
tract-escalating costs and portion control- although not involving labor costs directly,
were nevertheless suitable for resolution through mandatory bargaining. Declining to
follow the First Nat'l Maintenance "labor cost" analysis, the majority reasoned that
"production cost matters . . . by their very nature include wages, fringe benefits, and
other employment costs, over which the union can exercise substantial control." Id. at
1371.
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sense.
The firm also failed to satisfy the K test since it did not incur
substantial sunk cost losses on its physical capital. According to the ma-
jority, Bob's Big Boy did not "engage in any substantial capital restruc-
turing or investment.""'3 In addition, the firm was able to return, sell,
or convert all of the machines used in the shrimp processing depart-
ment, at no apparent loss. Moreover, the shrimp processing area was
not left vacant but was converted to storage. Thus, Bob's actions satis-
fied neither component of the sunk-cost-loss rule; the Board's decision,
therefore, that this subcontracting was a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing is consistent with the economic rule's assignment of a bargaining
rule in this situation. 84
A more recent subcontracting decision, Garwood-Detroit Truck
Equipment, Inc.,185 reveals the difficulty in staying within the eco-
nomic rationale underlying Fibreboard and First National Mainte-
nance without explicit statements of the sunk-cost-loss principles. Gar-
wood mounted and serviced truck equipment and sold truck parts. In
response to ongoing financial losses, 86 Garwood laid off its mounting
and service employees and, without bargaining with the union before-
hand, retained a subcontractor to perform the mounting and service
work for Garwood's customers. The subcontractor performed this work
at Garwood's plant using the same equipment that Garwood's union-
ized workers had used. In addition, the subcontractor paid a percentage
of Garwood's rent and utility bills, a monthly fee for the rental of Gar-
wood's equipment, and procured liability and other insurance for Gar-
wood's benefit.
18 7
The Board held that Garwood-Detroit did not have to bargain
over its subcontracting decision. 88 The majority asserted that bargain-
ing was not necessary because the subcontracting decision "did not turn
on labor costs-although labor costs were one component of the over-
183 Id.
184 It is possible, however, that the "storage" usage was in fact minimal and that
the firm did incur significant losses as a result of discontinuing its shrimp processing
operation. Conversely, the shrimp processing area might have occupied a very small
proportion of the total plant area, so that any loss would have been minimal. The
important point is that the sunk-cost-loss rule suggests the facts that are necessary for
the Board to resolve subcontracting cases in an economically meaningful way.
185 274 N.L.R.B. 113 (1985).
188 The employer indicated in its original notice to the union that it intended to
subcontract work in response to "the present dire economic conditions presently pre-
vailing in the . . . area." Id. at 113.
187 Id. at 115.
188 As in Bob's Big Boy, the majority upheld the Administrative Law Judge's
finding that the firm committed an unfair labor practice by failing to bargain over
effects. See id.
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head costs [Garwood-Detroit] intended to reduce by the subcontract-
ing-but rather turned on a significant change in the nature and direc-
tion of its business: a decision to abandon its service and mounting
operations."' 89 On the facts presented, the Board majority appears to
reach an economically unsound result. In contrast, Member Dennis's
dissent more closely follows the sunk-cost-loss test and the Board's deci-
sion in Bob's Big Boy."' The dissent implicitly recognizes that the W *
H component of the sunk-cost-loss rule had not been met, since "the
same work is still being provided at the same location to the same cus-
tomers.""' That is, the firm did not cut its total H. Although it may
have contemplated the elimination of its service and mounting opera-
tions, 92 at the time the firm made its subcontracting decision, the firm
had not yet committed itself to divestiture and thus did not "abandon"
this aspect of the business. In addition, the firm did not meet the K test:
it mitigated any sunk cost losses it might otherwise have suffered by
leasing the work area and selling the equipment to the subcontractor.
Not only is the Garwood-Detroit dissent more consistent with the
sunk-cost-lost rule, but it is also fully compatible with the test stated by
the majority, which follows Otis Elevator H1.9' Subcontracting that
does not involve a sunk cost loss "turns on labor costs" to the extent
that wage cuts are perfect substitutes for such cost cutting. The union,
instead of offering wage concessions, could offer to pay a percentage of
the firm's rent, utility bills, and insurance, just as the subcontractor
did.19 Even under the majority's test, therefore, the subcontracting
should have been prohibited. In many circumstances the labor cost test
will probably be interpreted consistently with the sunk-cost-loss rule.
The sunk-cost-loss rule, however, is a simpler, more direct statement of
the efficient contracting rule adopted by the Supreme Court.
"' Id. The majority also rejected the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that
the subcontracting constituted a midterm modification in violation of § 8(d). Thus, this
case differs from the cases discussed so far in that it arose during the term of an ex-
isting collective agreement. Full discussion of the midterm issue is postponed, however,
until presentation of Milwaukee Spring I. See infra notes 236-43 and accompanying
text.
190 See Garwood, 274 N.L.R.B. at 117 (Dennis, dissenting in part).
191 Id. at 117 (Dennis, dissenting in part).
192 See id. at 115 ("[Garwood-Detroit] was contemplating divesting itself of its
large shop equipment . . ").
193 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text. Otis
Elevator 11 held that the determinative distinction is whether the decision was based on
labor costs rather than a change in the nature or direction of the business. See Otis
Elevator II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 899.
194 For a more detailed comparison of the labor cost test and the sunk-cost-loss
rule, see infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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C. Work Relocation Under the Supreme Court Framework
1. The Economics of Relocation
Work relocation presents an economically more complex problem
than subcontracting or partial closure because relocation involves mul-
tiplant firms. Two new issues are raised.
First, in adjusting to changed product market conditions, a mul-
tiplant firm will be driven by profit maximization to consolidate work
among its various plants. Profit maximization requires that the mul-
tiplant firm set the level of output in such a way as to equalize the
marginal costs at each plant; thus, work flows from high to low margi-
nal cost plants. Due to economies of scale and differences in technology
across plants, even a small decline in product demand could require
large changes in staffing or hours of work at different plants. If a firm
does not have the entitlement to adjust output to realize economies of
scale, its profits could be highly vulnerable. A firm unable to consoli-
date work through relocation could be driven from the market entirely.
Therefore, a firm, in a low transaction cost setting, would not sign a
contract that so restricted its ability to adjust.
Second, the potential for strategic behavior is increased by the fact
that the firm must face two groups of workers rather than one group.
In single plant cases, one firm "jointly maximizes" with one group of
workers or, in a unionized firm, with the agent of those workers."' 5 In
multiplant cases, however, the workers in the two (or more) plants may
either be in different bargaining units196 or one group of workers may
not be unionized. As a result, the two groups of workers and the firm
may not be able to develop a cross-plant layoff schedule comparable to
the seniority schedule within a single plant.
These two novel features of work relocation pose a dilemma. The
need to realize economies of scale strengthens the case for giving the
entitlement to the firm, as long as it satisfies the sunk cost loss rule. But
the problem of two groups of workers weakens the power of the W * H
test to restrict strategic behavior by itself.
"" The main economic justification for unions in internal labor markets is that
the union acts as an agent of the workers. Because the union has the exclusive right to
bargain on behalf of all workers in the bargaining unit, the union can overcome free-
rider problems that otherwise exist and thus facilitate joint profit-maximizing contracts.
See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 4, at 1071-74.
198 If the workers in the different plants were in the same bargaining unit, the
problems posed by two or more groups of workers would not arise. The NLRB uses
the "community of interests" standard to determine which employees should be in-
cluded in a bargaining unit. See R. GORMAN, supra note 69, at 68-69. Thus, if the
employees are in separate units, they do not share a community of interests.
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In the polar case, when a firm, in the process of consolidation, cuts
total H across plants by the amount of the decline in H in the high cost
plant (the victim-plant of the relocation), the W * H test remains suffi-
cient. Such a relocation resembles a First National Maintenance-type
partial closure.
If, on the other hand, the relocation involves only a partial change
in total H (that is, there is an increase in H at the low-cost plant that
is close to the decrease in H at the high-cost plant), then the relocation
resembles Fibreboard-type subcontracting. Such relocations primarily
involve a reduction in wages. In particular, if the increase in H at the
low-cost plant involves transferring junior workers from the high-cost
plant, then the relocation would carry a great potential for strategic
behavior. Such a relocation may nevertheless be permitted if the firm
satisfies the K test, which looks to the K loss at the high cost plant. If,
for example, the firm has closed the high cost plant and scrapped the
equipment, then the K loss satisfies the sunk cost loss rule. Although
the multiplant firm may be allowed to relocate some of the equipment
along with the work, the greater the amount of K that is relocated, the
less likely that the move will satisfy the K test.
Thus, in these relocation cases, the sunk-cost-loss rule involves a
calculation that compares the sum of the losses in the firm's investments
in K and H with the senior workers' deferred compensation. If the
firm's losses in K and H investments are large relative to the deferred
compensation owed to the workers in the high cost plant, the firm
would have the entitlement to relocate. In contrast, when the firm
strongly mitigates these losses, the union would have the entitlement.
In certain cases, the firm may satisfy the sunk-cost-loss rule even
though it proposes to transfer some junior workers. In such cases, "ef-
fects bargaining" could be used as additional protection for senior
workers. Under effects bargaining, although the firm would have the
entitlement to relocate after having absorbed a sunk cost loss, the firm
would have a duty to bargain with the workers in the high cost plant
regarding which workers would be displaced. Mandatory bargaining
over effects is, in fact, the entitlement protection that the Board typi-
cally accords to workers in relocated plants. 9 Effects bargaining in
197 See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681-82; see also Chippewa Motor
Freight, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 455, 460 & n.12 (1982) (employer must bargain over ef-
fects regardless of employer's bankruptcy); Whitehall Packing Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 193,
195 (1981) (order to bargain regarding effects on employees of decision to transfer unit
operations); Burgmeyer Bros., 254 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1028 (1981) (order for management
to bargain with union over effects of closing operations). This entitlement typically
requires the employer to discuss such matters as severance pay, accrued vacation and
other pay, pension rights, transfer to other company locations, and retraining. See
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relocation cases is broader than effects bargaining in subcontracting and
partial closure cases, which mainly involves severance pay and recall
schedules.
At this point, it is unclear how effects bargaining works in prac-
tice. While some legal scholars suggest that effects bargaining accords
little protection to the workers,19 others contend that it could be tanta-
mount to decision bargaining. 99 The less protection effects bargaining
provides to workers in practice, the weaker is the case for its use as a
means of constraining the firm's relocation entitlement. 00
As a final point, one must keep in mind the basic tenet that the
law only fixes the default settings. Given the difficulties of effects bar-
gaining or of adjudication of the issue, the parties are themselves likely
to devote more attention to the problem during contract formation.
Given the inherent conflict between the need to consolidate and the ex-
istence of two groups of workers, the current uneasy solution may be
the best available. The firms would retain the right to relocate, but not
to transfer junior workers from the closed plant. The workers, in turn,
would capture their deferred compensation in the form of higher cur-
rent wages, severance pay, and other such provisions.
Gorman, supra note 168, at 1367.
198 See Gorman, supra note 168, at 1367-69. Gorman argues that in most reloca-
tion cases there will not be
a credible union threat of economic pressure, either because the facility at
which they work will close imminently anyway and there will be no other
company facility nearby at which a picketing appeal can be made, or be-
cause the employees on the brink of termination will likely have little ap-
petite to undertake a strike effort.
Id. at 1368.
199 See Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of
First National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 402, 421 (1983) ("[B]ecause 'effects
are so inextricably interwoven with the decision itself,' there seems no way to prevent
bargaining over the former from having an impact on the latter." (quoting Ozark
Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 570 (1966))).
200 On the other hand, the more effects bargaining protects workers, the more
likely it will nullify the firm's decision entitlement. One of the key issues involving
effects bargaining is the time at which the union has a right to be notified of the need
for such bargaining. See P. MISCIMARRA, supra note 138, at 162-66; Kohler, supra
note 199, at 416-18. At least one court of appeals has held that the firm has no duty to
bargain over effects until a decision to relocate is actually made. See NLRB v. National
Car Rental Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1182, 1188 (3d Cir. 1982). If notice is required before
a decision is made, effects bargaining and decision bargaining would almost certainly
merge. In this case, effects bargaining may not be desirable.
Thus, it may not be possible to promulgate rules governing effects bargaining that
preserve the firm's decision entitlement yet provide meaningful protection to the work-
ers. Kohler notes that the distinction between the time a firm becomes committed to its
decision and the time the firm implements the decision "is a fine one at best. In reality,
there may be no way to distinguish the timing." Kohler, supra note 199, at 418 n.86.
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2. Otis Elevator II
Since First National Maintenance, the Board has had several op-
portunities to examine plant relocations. 201 Two cases, Otis Elevator II
and Milwaukee Spring 11,202 stand out as the major precedents in this
still unclear area. Both demonstrate how the economic analysis devel-
oped in the previous Sections can resolve the issues in these and future
relocation cases.
Otis Elevator II, decided after Milwaukee Spring II, presents the
clearest statement of the Board's analysis of the plant relocation prob-
lem. After being taken over by United Technologies in 1975, Otis Ele-
vator decided that its research and development operations at its Mah-
wah, New Jersey plant were outdated. Otis subsequently constructed a
new research center at its headquarters in East Hartford, Connecticut,
with the intention of consolidating its research and development activi-
ties there. 03 Otis refused to bargain over its decision to relocate and
transfer seventeen union employees to the new plant, as well as the
effects of that decision.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board,
which held in Otis Elevator 1214 that the firm had violated the Act by
refusing to bargain over the relocation decision and its effects. While
the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided First National
Maintenance. As a result, the appeals court remanded the case to the
NLRB and the Board reversed Otis Elevator L205
The plurality in Otis Elevator II found First National Mainte-
nance directly applicable to relocation, but eschewed the specific bal-
ancing test developed in First National Maintenance.0 6 Instead, the
201 See, e.g., Metropolitan Teletronics, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1107 (1986); Oak
Rubber Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1985); Inland Steel Container Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 929
(1985).
202 Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984),
affd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
203 United Technologies had a research and development center in East Hartford
to which some Otis employees from a different New Jersey plant had previously been
transferred. See 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
204 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981).
205 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) [Otis Elevator II]. A plurality of the Board decided
the case, with Member Dennis concurring separately and Member Zimmerman con-
curring in part and dissenting in part.
206 See id. at 891, 893-94. In contrast, Member Dennis, in her concurrence,
closely followed First National Maintenance in analyzing Otis Elevator's decision to
relocate: -
The first step is to determine whether . . . the employer's decision is
"amenable to resolution through the bargaining process.". ..
...The second step in the analysis . . . involves weighing the fact
that the decision is amenable to resolution through the bargaining process
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plurality adopted what it felt to be a more predictable test that relied
on Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence as incorporated by First
National Maintenance. Under this test,
the critical factor to a determination whether the decision is
subject to mandatory bargaining is the essence of the decision
itself, i.e., whether it turns upon a change in the nature or
direction of the business, or turns upon labor costs; not its
effect on employees nor a union's ability to offer
alternatives.2 o7
The plurality thus reasoned that the crucial difference between
Fibreboard and First National Maintenance was that Fibreboard's de-
cision "turn[ed] upon a reduction of labor costs,"208 while First Na-
tional Maintenance's action was based on a change in the "scope, direc-
tion, or nature of the business."20 9
Given this test and the facts of Otis, the plurality concluded that
the relocation decision was not a mandatory subject because it turned
upon a fundamental change in the nature and direction of the business
and not upon labor costs.210 In addition, the Board, over the dissent of
Member Zimmerman, remanded to the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) the determination of whether the firm engaged in an unfair la-
bor practice by refusing to bargain over the effects of the relocation.211
("the benefit") against the constraints that process places on management
("the burden").
Id. at 897 (Dennis, concurring) (citations omitted) (punctuation altered).
Member Zimmerman did not advocate the First National Maintenance balancing
test. He argued that a relocation decision is a mandatory subject "when the decision is
amenable to resolution through collective bargaining." Id. at 900 (Zimmerman, concur-
ring in part). Zimmerman also argued for this rule in his dissent in Milwaukee Spring
11. See Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 605.
For a general discussion of Otis Elevator 11 that contends the NLRB failed to
apply properly the First National Maintenance balancing test, see George, To Bar-
gain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 667, 686-95 (1985).
207 Otis Elevator I, 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
208 Id. at 893.
209 Id.
210 The plurality stated:
[Otis] made its decision because of its opinion that its technology was
dated, its product was not competitive, its Mahwah research and develop-
ment operation duplicated other operations, and because a newer and
larger research and development center was available in East Hartford.
These facts establish that the [Otis's] decision did not turn upon labor
costs even though that factor may have been one of the circumstances
which stimulated the evaluation process which generated the decision.
Id. at 892 (footnotes omitted).
2"1 Id. at 894. Member Zimmerman "adher[ed] to the Board's findings in its ini-
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Recently, in Otis Elevator III,212 the Board upheld the ALJ's determi-
nation that the firm committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to
bargain over the effects of its decision to transfer unit work.2"'
The sunk-cost-loss rule leads to the same result reached by the
Board: giving the firm an intermediate property rule entitlement to
relocate, with mandatory bargaining over the effects. The relocation
was an efficient move away from an outdated plant rather than a stra-
tegic ploy to avoid paying deferred compensation. Faced with a declin-
ing market share, Otis wanted to consolidate its research and develop-
ment operations at its new plant to eliminate duplicative facilities and
thereby reduce costs by taking advantage of economies of scale. Most
likely, the pure W * H test was not satisfied; any cut in H was a
partial cut, because some workers were transferred. Nevertheless, the
firm satisfied the K test by idling its old plant.21 '
On the other hand, the firm refused to bargain with the union
over the transfer criteria and the individuals selected for the transfer.
The previous subsection argued that allowing a firm to choose unilater-
ally which workers are to perform relocated work could permit strate-
gic behavior.2"5 This problem can be resolved in two ways. First, as the
Board determined in Otis Elevator III,2"6 the firm can be required to
bargain over the effects of the relocation, including the issue of worker
relocation.21 Second, as suggested in this Article, if the firm substan-
tially mitigated its sunk cost loss by transferring junior workers, the
decision to relocate could be interpreted as a failure to satisfy the sunk-
cost-loss rule.
Although the sunk-cost-loss rule and the Board's "labor cost" test
reach the same result in Otis II and are largely compatible with each
other, the Board's test is problematic. The first problem with this test
involves the definition of "labor costs." Otis Elevator II is not clear on
tial decision . . .that the company violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to
bargain in good faith over the effects of the transfer decision ... ." Id. at 901 (Zim-
merman, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1334 (1987).
2"3 The NLRB also upheld the ALJ's finding that Otis violated § 8(a)(5) and
(a)(1) by bargaining directly with the employees to be transferred. See id. at 1337.
However, the NLRB reversed the ALJ's finding that Otis did not bargain in good faith
over the particular relocation package offered to the transferred employees. See id. at
1338.
214 The loss in the old plant most likely occurred gradually over time. In measur-
ing the size of the firm's sunk cost loss on its physical capital, the relevant previous
value of the capital is the value at the time the workers entered into the current con-
tract containing deferred compensation.
215 See supra text following note 196.
216 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1334 (1987).
217 See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 136:1349
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
whether the phrase "labor costs" refers to the wage rate (W) or to total
labor costs (W * H).
Based on the sunk-cost-loss rule, labor costs must refer to W, not
to W * H. If labor costs mean total labor costs, then under the Board's
test a firm's decision to cut total hours due to overcapacity would be a
mandatory subject. This result would be inconsistent with the economic
rule implied in First National Maintenance.218
The more significant problem with the Board's test is that the ef-
fect of the action on labor costs must be compared with the effect of the
action on the nature and direction of the business. The Board, however,
has not clearly identified the economic factors that differentiate between
the two components of the test. Obviously, given this lack of guidance,
firms have an incentive to characterize actions that in an economic
sense turn on labor costs as actions that involve a change in scope and
direction.'29
The sunk-cost-loss rule alleviates the problems presented by the
Board's test by clarifying the economic facts that differentiate between
scope and direction and labor costs. Specifically, if a case is about an
effective cut in W, without reductions in H or losses in K, then the case
"turns upon" labor costs and is not about nature and direction.
Fibreboard is such a case. Alternatively, if the facts present evidence of
sunk cost losses in H and K, then the case is about nature and direction
and not about labor costs. Otis Elevator II (K loss) and First National
Maintenance (H loss) are examples of such cases.
3. Milwaukee Spring II
The second influential plant relocation case, which actually pre-
ceded Otis Elevator II, is Milwaukee Spring I. This case involved the
Illinois Coil Company, a manufacturing firm consisting of three plants.
During the term of its collective bargaining agreement, Illinois Coil lost
218 The confusion can be traced to Fibreboard's grouping of the acts of "reducing
the work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime payments." 379
U.S. at 213. The First National Maintenance Court characterized all three actions as
reductions in "labor costs." See 452 U.S. at 680. Reductions in the work force, how-
ever, would reduce only the total labor costs, not the wage rate, and would therefore be
permitted under the sunk-cost-loss rule.
219 The Board thought § 8(a)(3) could prevent an employer from masking an
intent to weaken a union by labeling a decision purely economic. See Otis Elevator II,
269 N.L.R.B. at 892 n.4 (citing First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682). But
neither the Board nor the First National Maintenance Court offered any guidance
about how to identify such mislabeling. Of course, if the decisions are clearly subter-
fuges designed solely to evade a collective agreement, the Board would find the deci-
sions tainted by antiunion animus and therefore violative of § 8(a)(3). See Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1965).
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a major customer. As a result of this downturn in its product market,
Illinois Coil tentatively proposed relocating its assembly operations
from its unionized Milwaukee Spring plant to its nonunionized Mc-
Henry plant in order to take advantage of the lower wage rate at Mc-
Henry. Illinois Coil informed the union that it was willing to keep the
assembly work at the Milwaukee Spring plant if the union would agree
to wage and benefit concessions. After substantial bargaining, the union
rejected these proposals and declined to bargain further. Illinois Coil
then announced its decision to relocate the assembly operations. 2"
The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board. The
parties stipulated that the relocation decision "was economically moti-
vated and was not the result of union animus."22 In addition, the par-
ties stipulated that the firm had bargained to impasse over the reloca-
tion decision and was willing to bargain over effects. In Milwaukee
Spring ,222 the Board held that the company had violated the Act and
ordered reinstatement of the employees. The firm appealed and was
granted its motion to remand to the Board for further consideration.223
On remand, in Milwaukee Spring II, the NLRB reversed its earlier
decision, over the dissent of Member Zimmerman.224 The union ap-
pealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the NLRB decision.225
The facts presented by the three opinions in Milwaukee Spring II
suggest that the relocation decision was efficient rather than strategic
because the sunk-cost-loss rule was satisfied. Although the facts do not
specifically reveal whether the firm intended to cut H as a result of the
relocation, the firm had just lost a contract with a major customer.
226
Thus, it is almost certain that the firm would cut total H in conjunc-
tion with the relocation. To the extent that firm did not increase H at
the second plant, the W * H test would have allowed the relocation. If
H did increase at the second plant, the sunk-cost-loss rule would look
to the K test.
The relocation may have satisfied the K test. Some equipment was
transferred,22 7 which suggests only a small sunk cost loss, but the as-
220 See Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
221 Id.
222 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
222 Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
224 See id. at 605.
221 See UAW Local 547 v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
226 In his dissent, Member Zimmerman notes that "[ilt is unclear from the record
whether th[e] loss [of the contract] resulted in a decreased amount of assembly work,
molding work, or other work." Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 608-09 n.5
(Zimmerman, dissenting).
22 See id. at 608 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
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sembly work represented one-third of the work performed at the Mil-
waukee Spring plant,2 8 which suggests a larger sunk cost loss. Even if
the firm mitigated some of its K losses, meeting the W * H test is
sufficient to satisfy the sunk-cost-loss rule. Of course, if the Board had
specifically applied the sunk-cost-loss rule, different facts might have
come to light to suggest a potentially strategic rather than efficient
relocation.
Application of the sunk-cost-loss rule to the facts of Milwaukee
Spring H is complicated by the fact that the case presents not only the
economic issues specifically relevant to relocation, but also the related
legal analysis generally applicable to midterm disputes. In law and eco-
nomics terminology, the case involves two important issues: which party
gets the default entitlement regarding midterm relocation and how this
entitlement is to be protected. The three opinions in Milwaukee Spring
H-the Board majority, the court of appeals decision, and the Board
dissent-apply very different analyses to these two issues. The next
subsections compare and evaluate these various approaches against the
economic approach to midterm entitlement protection and the sunk-
cost-loss rule.
a. Board Majority
The Board majority based its ruling that there was no unfair labor
practice on narrow legal grounds. According to the majority, the con-
tract between Illinois Coil and the union was silent on the subject of
relocation; hence, the relocation did not modify the collective agreement
in violation of section 8(d) of the NLRA." 9 In addition, the majority
reasoned that without any relevant term "contained in" the collective
agreement, the most the firm had to do was bargain before it relo-
cated.230 Since the firm bargained with the union over its decision to
relocate and stood willing to bargain over effects, the firm had met its
statutory obligations.
The Board majority correctly refused to imply a work preservation
clause, that is, an absolute property rule entitlement for the union. 3 '
The opinion recognized that giving the union an absolute entitlement
protected by a property rule would, in effect, give the union "veto
power ' ' 31 over midterm plant relocation, which the union then could
228 See id. (Zimmerman, dissenting).
229 See id. at 602 ("[Wle have searched the contract in vain for a provision requir-
ing bargaining unit work to remain in Milwaukee.").
220 See id.
231 See id.
22 Id. at 605.
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use strategically to obtain costly concessions from the firm and hinder
efficient work shifting.
But the majority avoided determining whether the contested relo-
cation was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Instead, it assumed ar-
guendo that relocation was a mandatory subject.2"3 As a result, the
Board majority never answered clearly either the question of which
party had the entitlement regarding relocation or the question of how
the entitlement was to be protected midterm.3 4
b. Court of Appeals
Unlike the Board decision, the court of appeals opinion235 focused
on the question of how midterm entitlements should be protected. The
court analytically separated this question from the question of which
party should get the entitlement. Thus, the opinion is the most useful
vehicle for comparing the legal and economic approach to these two
issues.
(i) Midterm Entitlement Protection
The court of appeals first argued that because the relocation deci-
sion occurred midterm, the court had to decide the "threshold issue [of]
whether . . . the relocation decision was 'contained in' the contract"
2 6
and thereby subject to property rule protection midterm under section
8(d). The court assumed that the relocation decision was a mandatory
subject2 137 and reasoned that the decision was contained in the agree-
ment as a result of either the management rights clause, implied man-
agement rights, or the zipper clause.238 The zipper clause dominated
the other two possibilities because, under the court's broad interpreta-
tion, if an agreement contains a zipper clause, all mandatory subjects
are deemed to be contained in the agreement. Thus, the court concluded
that the presence of a broadly worded zipper clause precluded all
23 See id. at 601 n.5.
234 A plurality did conclude, however, that "an employer need not obtain a
union's consent on a matter not contained in the body of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment even though the subject is a mandatory subject of bargaining." Id. at 603 Mem-
ber Dennis did not join this part of the opinion. Thus, the plurality apparently would
never assign a midterm property rule to the union as a default setting if the entitlement
is not explicitly covered by the agreement.
... UAW Local 547 v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 184 (D.C.Cir. 1985).
236 Id. at 181.
237 See id. at 181 n.23.
238 See id. at 180-82. From an economic perspective, a zipper clause may be
viewed as merely an explicit statement by the parties of the entitlement protection
method that would be implied in the absence of such a clause.
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midterm mandatory bargaining.239 Midterm bargaining could still oc-
cur, but it would be permissive rather than mandatory bargaining. The
court, therefore, discerned two possible midterm outcomes: either the
firm had a property rule entitlement to relocate because of the manage-
ment rights clause or an implied management right, or the union had a
property rule entitlement to prevent the relocation. 40
Although the court's expansive interpretation of zipper clauses de-
parts from the conventional legal treatment,241 the court's resolution of
the issue of midterm entitlement protection is fully consistent with the
economic approach taken in this Article. As argued in an earlier
Part,242 bargaining rules are relatively efficient at endterm, but are rel-
atively costly at midterm, especially in a nonconjectural situation. Even
if bargaining rules are the least costly alternative at midterm, they may
be ineffective. The union's ability to strike makes endterm bargaining
rules effective. But during the term of most collective agreements, the
strike option is usually foreclosed by the presence of a no-strike clause.
Thus, mandatory midterm bargaining more closely resembles permis-
sive endterm bargaining than mandatory endterm bargaining.
2 43
(ii) Default Entitlement Setting
After deciding that the relocation entitlement is contained in the
contract, a court must then decide in which explicit clause or implied
term of the agreement the entitlement is zippered up. In the jargon of
law and economics, having decided to protect midterm entitlements
with property rules, the court must then decide which party gets the
property rule entitlement. The D.C. Circuit maintained that the firm
has a property rule entitlement to relocate contained in either the man-
agement rights clause or implied management rights.2 44 The court re-
239 See id. at 180.
2'0 See id. at 182-83.
241 The Board does not tend to find that a zipper clause waives bargaining rights
unless the clause contains explicit restrictions or unless the negotiating history of the
clause supports such a waiver. Courts of appeals, however, seem to be more willing to
construe broadly worded zipper clauses as waivers. See P. MISCIMARRA, supra note
138, at 76-78.
242 See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
242 The firm faced with a midterm bargaining rule entitlement need only bargain
in good faith until an impasse is reached and then act unilaterally, as did Illinois Coil.
Of course, a union faced with a midterm bargaining rule could still succeed in
offering concessions sufficient to induce the firm to trade away its entitlement. In fact,
as Professor Schwab points out, the union in Milwaukee Spring did just that. See
Schwab, supra note 4, at 247 n.7. The union offered (and the firm accepted) a wage
concession, which resulted in no transfer of work and no loss of union jobs. See Mil-
waukee Spring II Upheld, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 696, at 1, 2 (June 21, 1985).
244 See UAW Local 547, 765 F.2d at 181-82.
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lied predominantly on the broadly worded management rights clause,
which gave the firm the "exclusive right . . . to determine the opera-
tions or services to be performed in or at the plant . . . or to relieve
employees because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons...
or to change . . . facilities. 241 5 The court supported its interpretation of
the management rights clause by indicating that the union conceded
that the clause covered the contested relocation.246
The court's assignment of the entitlement to the firm is consistent
with the economic approach, although the court bases its conclusion on
a literal reading of the management rights clause rather than on an
explicit analysis of the relevant economic facts surrounding the reloca-
tion. The economic approach would interpret a broad management
rights clause in the same way that it would determine whether an enti-
tlement was a mandatory subject of bargaining-by using the sunk-
cost-loss rule. The management rights clause under this approach codi-
fies the sunk-cost-loss rule. In the clause used by Illinois Coil, for ex-
ample, the "right . . . to relieve employees because of lack of work"
corresponds to the W * H test, while the "right . . . to change . . .
facilities '2 47 corresponds to the K test. Hence, one can interpret the
clause to cover efficient, but not potentially strategic, relocation.24
On the other hand, if a midterm relocation violates the sunk-cost-
loss rule, then it cannot be contained in a generic management rights
clause.2 49 For example, relocation to avoid deferred compensation
2145 Id. at 182 n.24.
246 See id. at 182. This argument should not be pushed too far. First, the lan-
guage of the management rights clause is somewhat ambiguous with respect to transfers
of work from one plant to another. Second, it is possible that the reason the union
"conceded" that the clause covered the relocation was that the union did not anticipate
the court's broad interpretation of zipper clauses, which would have given the union a
midterm property rule entitlement if the transfer entitlement had not been contained in
the management rights clause. Finally, if one can look to the union's actions in deter-
mining whether the entitlement was contained in the clause, one can also look to the
firm's actions. In this case, the firm bargained about the relocation and stipulated that
the entitlement was a mandatory subject. If the firm had thought that the management
rights clause applied, it might not have bargained at all.
247 Id. at 182 n.24.
248 One may wonder why a firm would include a management rights clause in a
collective agreement if that clause does not enhance the rights of management. The firm
may do so because it may be uncertain that the default setting will be observed in its
absence. Inserting a boilerplate management rights clause into the contract is practi-
cally costless to the firm and deters the errant adjudicative body from misapplying the
proper default setting. In addition, it is important to remember management rights
clauses can add to the default entitlements of the firm if they are addressed to specific
decisions and contingencies.
249 The court's opinion is not inconsistent with this interpretation. The court finds
the entitlement contained in the management rights clause largely because the union
did not present any convincing arguments to the contrary. It is, of course, possible that
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would not be a "legitimate reason" to "relieve employees" under the
Illinois Coil clause, and the right to engage in such relocation would
not be contained in that clause. Instead, the economic approach suggests
that the Board find such a relocation contained in the wage provision of
the collective agreement, because a violation of the sunk-cost-loss rule
constitutes an effective wage cut.
(iii) Unresolved Midterm Relocation Issues
The court opinion leaves several issues unresolved. Because these
issues will likely be present in future midterm relocation cases, it is
useful to compare the court's analysis with the economic analysis of
these issues.
First, the court suggests that arbitration be used in cases like Mil-
waukee Spring II to resolve the entitlement concerning the relocation
decision.25 The court, however, offers no guidance about when the
Board should defer to an existing arbitration award" 1 or an uninvoked
arbitration procedure.252 Nor does the court offer guidance about what
criteria arbitrators should use in making their decisions. Although the
the union could not find any persuasive arguments because none existed in this case.
On the other hand, the court probably would have been willing to consider an argu-
ment by the union that the relocation was potentially strategic, and was therefore not
permitted by the management rights clause.
210 See Local 547 UAW, 765 F.2d at 182 n.26. The author of the opinion, Judge
Harry Edwards, emphasizes this point even more strongly in an article published sub-
sequent to the opinion. See Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty
to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHio ST.
L.J. 23, 32-33 (1985).
251 The Board, however, has promulgated its own standards for deferral to an
existing arbitration award. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
252 See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) (holding that the Board
can defer to arbitration even if the parties themselves have not invoked the arbitration
process). Judge Edwards advocates an expansion of the Collyer doctrine to'what he
terms the "contractual waiver doctrine":
In the traditional Collyer-type case, the proper analysis is not one of
deferral at all, but rather of waiver . . . . I believe that when the parties
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement and stipulate that they will
arbitrate disputes arising under it, they have waived many of their statu-
tory rights under the NLRA. The parties' agreement, in essence, sup-
plants the statute as the source of many employee rights in the context of
collective bargaining.
Edwards, supra note 250, at 28. In particular,
where a dispute pertains to a waivable subject that is covered by the arbi-
tration clause, the parties have waived their rights under the NLRA and
have replaced them with the rights created by the contract. The parties
have provided that disputes arising under the contract should be resolved
by an arbitrator. The Board, therefore, is precluded from reaching the
dispute and the arbitrator's decision is final.
Id. at 30.
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issue of deferral is beyond the scope of this Article, if arbitrators are
called upon to decide whether a relocation decision is contained in an
agreement, the economic approach would offer the sunk-cost-loss rule
to the arbitrator as the proper tool for a reasoned and fair analysis.253
Second, the court did not, nor did it have to, decide whether the
firm had to engage in effects bargaining because the firm "stood willing
to bargain over the effects of the move." '  Although the court might
have required effects bargaining if faced with the issue, the court's
broad reading of zipper clauses might eliminate even midterm
mandatory bargaining over effects. The unresolved question under this
approach is how to resolve the midterm property rule entitlement con-
cerning effects. The economic analysis of relocation suggests that effects
should not be deemed to be contained in the management rights clause.
Instead, effects would be deemed to be contained in the layoff and sev-
erance clauses. If the parties' treatment of these effects is explicitly con-
tained in the collective agreement, then obviously the entitlement setting
will be clear. In relocation cases, however, because of the presence of
more than one group of workers, cross-plant layoff schedules are
rare.255 If, therefore, these clauses do not explicitly cover the effects of
relocation-for example, if the layoff clause deals with intraplant but
not cross-plant seniority-then an arbitrator or court must fill in the
gaps.
253 The scope of an arbitrator's authority is a well-recognized dilemma in labor
law. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583-85
(1960) (holding that unless there is specific language excluding a matter from arbitra-
tion, any question of coverage should be resolved in favor of arbitration). Typical con-
tract language limits an arbitrator's authority by stating that the arbitrator cannot mod-
ify or add to any of the terms and provisions of a contract nor make any decisions on
matters not covered by specific provisions of the contract. See, e.g., 2 Collective Bar-
gaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:281 (1986). An example of the dilemma is whether
there should be judicial deference to an arbitrator's incorrect decision on a relocation
clearly contained in the management rights clause because it involves a case of "lack of
work" (the W * H test) or "change in facilities" (K test). Effects entitlements do not
pose this dilemma because they would not be deemed contained in a broad management
rights clause.
2' Local 547 UAW, 765 F.2d at 181.
'5 See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text. A 1986 survey showed that
91% of the contracts surveyed include layoff provisions and 60% of the contracts permit
an employee scheduled for layoff to displace less senior employees in other jobs (bump-
ing). Of those contracts allowing bumping in specified areas, only 7% permit the prac-
tice throughout the company compared with 30% that permit bumping throughout the
plant; 21% permit it only within the employee's division or department, and 37% re-
strict it to the employees' classification or group. Another 3% of the contracts surveyed
allow bumping only to the employee's former job, classification, or group. See 2 Collec-
tive Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 60:1, 60:3 (1986); see also INDUSTRIAL UNION
DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO, COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENTS 162-78 (1984).
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In determining the appropriate entitlement concerning default ef-
fects, the basic point to consider is that two groups of workers are in-
volved. In particular, each group is likely to be explicitly or implicitly
protected by an intraplant seniority clause that should be respected.
Each group of workers is effectively protected by its own sunk-cost-loss
rule. The layoff clause at the high-cost plant would therefore prevent
the firm from transferring junior workers from the high-cost plant to
the low-cost plant. The senior workers must be transferred first. On the
other hand, the layoff clause at the low-cost plant would prevent the
senior workers at the high-cost plant from bumping junior workers at
the low-cost plant because the junior workers at the low-cost plant are
not part of the buffer protecting the senior workers at the high-cost
plant.
The final unresolved issue is whether the relocation decision is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The court, like the Board majority,
never decided whether the relocation at issue in Milwaukee Spring II
was a mandatory subject of bargaining;256 rather, both the majority and
the court assumed arguendo that the relocation was a mandatory
subject.
This issue becomes moot in midterm cases if property rule protec-
tion is used exclusively.25 If property rule entitlements replace bar-
gaining rule entitlements at midterm, there 'is no need to determine
whether a midterm relocation is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
It is interesting to note, however, that the economic test for decid-
ing whether an entitlement is mandatory endterm parallels the test for
deciding whether an entitlement is deemed contained in a management
rights clause midterm. The sunk-cost-loss rule determines both issues.
If a relocation, for example, satisfies the sunk-cost-loss rule, it is
deemed efficient, in which case it is a nonmandatory bargaining subject
governed by property rule protection for the firm at endterm and is
contained in a management rights clause midterm. If, however, the re-
location violates the sunk-cost-loss rule, it is deemed potentially strate-
gic, in which case it is a mandatory bargaining subject that is governed
2.6 See Local 547 UAW, 765 F.2d at 181 n.23.
257 This Article assumes that the parties have not agreed on a contractual provi-
sion that limits the firm's rights under the default setting. If the firm agrees to such a
provision and then breaches the agreement, the firm does not commit an unfair labor
practice-at least under § 8(a)(5)-if the subject is nonmandatory. The union in that
case is limited to traditional breach of contract remedies before a court. See Allied
Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 183-88
(1971).
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by mandatory bargaining at endterm and contained in the wage provi-
sion at midterm." 8
c. Board Dissent
The third opinion, the dissent of Member Zimmerman, is unique
in several respects. It is the only one of the three opinions that conflicts
'with the sunk-cost-loss rule on the facts presented. On the other hand,
it alone explicitly focuses on the possibility of midterm property rule
protection for the union based on the wage provisions in the agreement.
First, Zimmerman argues that the relocation was a mandatory
subject of bargaining because it more strongly resembled the subcon-
tracting in Fibreboard than the partial closure in First National Main-
tenance.159 Second, Zimmerman argues that the relocation, though not
specifically prohibited by the contract, was nevertheless a midterm
modification because it was motivated by "a desire to avoid a contrac-
tual term with regard to a mandatory subject of bargaining, such as
wages."26 Zimmerman's analysis of the first issue reaches a different
conclusion than would the economic analysis. His resolution of the sec-
ond issue is consistent with the economic approach.
In finding the relocation at issue to be a mandatory subject, Zim-
merman identifies some of the facts relevant to the sunk-cost-loss rule
analysis but fails to recognize the economic implications of those facts.
In particular, he maintains that the firm was performing the same
quantity of assembly work (that is, the firm was not cutting H). He
admits, however, that the record was "unclear" about the impact of the
lost contract on total production and asserted that his conclusion would
be the same "even if it resulted in less assembly work. '261 Under the
W * H test, however, if the firm did in fact cut total H, it would have
a property rule entitlement to relocate.
In contrast with his treatment of the relocation issue, Member
28 This Article does not mean to put forth a general theory of the use of bargain-
ing rules midterm, an issue which has confounded the NLRB for some time. See, e.g.,
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951) (company obligated to negotiate over issues
of pensions but not of group insurance during the contract term), enforced, 196 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1952). In particular, this Article does not argue that all mandatory sub-
jects are contained in a wage provision midterm, nor does it argue that all nonmanda-
tory subjects are contained in a management rights clause. Rather, the point is that in
dealing with issues concerning permissible adaptation to market conditions, the sunk-
cost-loss rule simultaneously serves two parallel functions: it determines whether an
issue is mandatory endterm and interprets the meaning of management rights clauses
midterm.
25 See Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 608-09 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
260 Id. at 611 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
261 Id. at 608-09 n.5 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
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Zimmerman's resolution of the midterm entitlement issue is consistent
with the economic approach. He argued that at midterm the union was
protected by a property rule against the relocation because the reloca-
tion indirectly modified the wage provisions of the contract. 62 The eco-
nomic approach developed in this Article views Fibreboard-type sub-
contracting and some relocation as indirect wage cutting. Although
Fibreboard holds that workers are protected against such indirect wage
cutting by bargaining rules, not property rules, Fibreboard is an
endterm case.
At midterm, the economic approach would advocate property rule
protection of the wage term against both direct and indirect wage cut-
ting. Thus, if Zimmerman were correct in his conclusion that the relo-
cation in Milwaukee Spring constituted an indirect wage cut that vio-
lated the sunk-cost-loss rule, his determination that the workers have
property rule protection midterm against such relocation would have
extended the Fibreboard rule in a way consistent with efficient con-
tracting principles.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the labor law governing collective
bargaining can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of efficient
labor market contracting. This law and economics approach views la-
bor law as addressing the market failure that exists in the internal la-
bor markets of firms. External labor markets tend to be reasonably effi-
cient, but internal labor markets suffer from the inefficiencies created
by high monitoring costs and firm-specific investments, which lead to
problems involving asymmetric information and strategic behavior.
The law and economics approach evaluates labor law's default set-
tings against a standard of rules that the parties themselves would
adopt if they were able to bargain in a low-transaction-cost environ-
ment. In such a context, the parties would write a joint profit-maximiz-
ing contract that would minimize both the costs of adjusting to new
economic conditions and the potential for strategic behavior.
In applying the standard law and economics apparatus, this Arti-
cle has argued that the National Labor Relation Act's statutory scheme
adds a unique method of protecting entitlements-bargaining rules-
that supplement Calabresi and Melamed's classic division of inaliena-
bility, property, and liability rules. Bargaining rules force the parties to
settle entitlement disputes between themselves by requiring bargaining
22 See id. at 611 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
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over mandatory subjects and by allowing the parties to impose costs on
each other in support of their positions. Bargaining rules are more effi-
cient in conjectural and endterm disputes than in nonconjectural and
midterm disputes. In these latter types of disputes, property rule pro-
tection is often more efficient.
Using these tools, this Article has evaluated the labor law concern-
ing subcontracting, partial closure, and relocation, and has argued that
in nonconjectural disputes, an efficient contracting solution gives an in-
termediate property rule entitlement to the firm over the decision, lim-
ited by the sunk-cost-loss rule. Under this rule, the firm has the unilat-
eral right to adapt to product market changes, but it cannot do this by
effectively cutting the wage rate; instead, it must incur a sunk cost loss
in the form of a cut in total hours of work (the W * H test) following
a seniority schedule, and, in cases involving partial cuts in hours, idling
of physical capital (the K test). Moreover, the rule does not give the
firm a unilateral right to determine the effects of its decision, such as
severance pay and cross-plant transfer schedules. The sunk-cost-loss
rule has strong self-enforcement properties. The firm, forced to absorb
a sunk-cost-loss in the process of exercising its entitlement is likely to
find strategic behavior unprofitable.
This Article has applied the sunk-cost-loss rule to six leading la-
bor law cases and argues that the Board and courts have implicitly used
this rule in decisions from Fibreboard63 and First National Mainte-
nance2 to Otis Elevator 1P65 and Milwaukee Spring I.266 In
Fibreboard, the firm reduced the wage rate by subcontracting and did
not take a sunk cost loss by cutting hours or idling capital; hence, the
firm's potentially strategic decision was ruled an unfair labor practice.
In First National Maintenance, on the other hand, the firm, in par-
tially closing its plant, absorbed a sunk cost loss by laying off workers.
Two more recent cases, Bob's Big Boy 67 and Garwood,'"8 help
highlight the value of explicitly identifying the economic logic underly-
ing the legal rule. Absent a clear statement of the economic model, in-
consistent results may occur in more complex cases.
Finally, this Article analyzed Otis Elevator H and Milwaukee
Spring II, in which relocations were at issue, arguing that relocation
poses a somewhat different set of economic problems than does subcon-
263 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
26 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
268 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
266 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), affd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
267 Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurants, 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
268 Garwood-Detroit Truck Equip., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 113 (1985).
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tracting or partial closure because multiplant firms, and hence more
than one group of workers, are involved. As a result, the K test has a
larger role, as does the determination of which workers can be relocated
to the surviving plant. In Otis, the Board implicitly followed the sunk-
cost-loss rule by allowing the firm to relocate away from an outdated
plant while requiring effects bargaining over the transfer schedule.
The Board in Otis also articulated a test for determining the
boundaries of management prerogatives in cases involving subcontract-
ing, partial closures, and relocation. The test distinguishes decisions
that turn on labor costs from those that affect the nature and direction
of the business. This Article suggests that this test can be interpreted in
a way that is entirely consistent with the sunk-cost-lost rule. When a
firm accepts a sunk cost loss, it makes a change in the "scope or direc-
tion" of its business. In contrast, when the firm acts strategically to cut
the wage rate without incurring a sunk cost loss, the firm makes a
decision that is primarily about "labor costs."
Unlike the previous cases discussed, Milwaukee Spring II clearly
presents the issue of how to protect midterm entitlements. The court of
appeals adopted an efficient rule that effectively eliminates, or at least
substantially narrows, the scope of midterm mandatory bargaining. In-
stead, the issue of which party should get the entitlement midterm is
determined by an arbitrator, or by the Board or the courts, using prop-
erty rules. Under this approach, entitlements concerning relocation are
contained in either the management rights clause, as the court of ap-
peals held, or the wage clause, as Board Member Zimmerman argued.
Whether an arbitrator or the court is called upon to determine the
midterm entitlement, the sunk-cost-loss rule can be used to resolve the
issue. If the relocation satisfies the sunk-cost-loss rule, then it is con-
tained in the management rights clause, just as it would be a nonman-
datory subject at endterm. On the other hand, if the relocation violates
the sunk-cost-loss rule, then it is contained in the wage clause, just as it
would be a mandatory subject at endterm. The facts presented in Mil-
waukee Spring H suggest that the court of appeals and the Board ma-
jority reached the efficient result consistent with efficient contracting.
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